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ABSTRACT
Technology is rapidly developing in nearly every field, and the 
automotive industry is no exception. Vehicle manufacturers have 
begun implementing impressive new automation in their high-end 
models, including adaptive cruise control, accident avoidance, and 
lane-departure warnings. But automotive technologists dream of 
going further—and they have. Multiple vehicle manufacturers are 
now testing “self-driving cars.” These fully autonomous vehicles 
operate at the push of a button, taking their passengers wherever 
they want to go. And the human “driver,” once responsible for every 
part of the vehicle’s operation, is now just along for the ride. In fact, 
some of the most advanced prototypes have no steering wheel at all.  
But in this exciting age of technology, the law is struggling to 
keep up. For example, it was just recently, in December of 2016, that 
the state of Michigan—the car capital of the world—passed 
legislation allowing autonomous vehicle to operate on public roads. 
And even with those newly minted statutes, there are huge gaps in 
how the law will treat a vehicle without a traditional driver. Legal 
publications have been examining many of these issues, but one area 
remains particularly neglected: criminal liability. This Article will 
examine the uncertainty surrounding criminal liability for both the 
manufactures and consumers of these complex machines. Ultimately, 
it proposes a new system called “products culpability.” This system 
offers a cogent framework that provides predictability if and when 
the self-driving car breaks the law. Who gets the ticket? Products 
culpability gives an answer.
 Associate, Warner, Norcross & Judd, LLP. J.D., Michigan State 
University College of Law (2016). 
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INTRODUCTION
If there is one thing that consistently and reliably captures the 
awe and attention of the American public, it is the promise of new 
technology.1 This fascination is evident in news ranging from 
futuristic military technology used on the battlefield2 to smart 
thermostats that control the temperature in one’s home.3 Now, to the 
forefront of the technology theater comes a technology that has been 
long-dreamt about: the autonomous vehicle (AV), or, more 
colloquially, the self-driving car.4
Although the most recent version of the AV may be new,5 the 
idea first “piqued the collective American and world imagination” at 
the Futurama exhibit at the 1939 World’s Fair.6 This technology 
promises to eliminate the driver, which is the most dangerous part of 
the car,7 and allows passengers to ride together in the family car 
without bothering to control steering, acceleration, or braking.8
While the prospect of (legally) reading the newspaper or an urgent 
 1. See Greg Scoblete, Why Americans Love Their Gadgets, REAL CLEAR 
TECH. (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.realcleartechnology.com/articles/2012/01/24/why_ 
americans_love_their_gadgets_81.html [https://perma.cc/7JG3-36LL]. 
 2. See POPULAR SCIENCE: MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, http://www.popsci.com/ 
military [https://perma.cc/4RWF-ZGJA] (last visited Dec. 27, 2016) (a portion of 
Popular Science dedicated to new military technology). 
 3. See Wi-Fi Smart Thermostat, HONEYWELL, http://yourhome.honeywell. 
com/en/products/thermostat/wi-fi-smart-thermostat-rth9580 [https://perma.cc/2S7Z-
BS6C] (last visited Dec. 27, 2016). 
 4. For the purposes of this Article, the term “autonomous vehicle” (AV) 
will be most appropriate, specifically meaning that the car drives itself through 
technology. Though certain elements of technology examined below may fall short 
of making one’s car fully “self-driving,” each new technological element added to 
the vehicle increases the level of automation. See infra note 13 and accompanying 
text; infra Section II.A. 
 5. Google debuted its—actually—self-driving car in 2014. It now operates 
the program under a project called Waymo. See Journey, WAYMO,
https://waymo.com/journey (last visited Jan. 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/GY7H-
X27W]. 
 6. JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORP., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE 
TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 1 (2016), http://www.rand.org/content/ 
dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR443-2/RAND_RR443-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ QFG5-3HU9].
 7. See Kevin Funkhouser, Paving The Road Ahead: Autonomous Vehicles, 
Products Liability, and the Need for a New Approach, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 437, 438 
(2013).
 8. See Frank Douma & Sarah Aue Palodichuk, Criminal Liability Issues 
Created by Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1157, 1160 (2012). 
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email certainly entices imaginative minds,9 AV technology poses a 
litany of questions.10 Many papers have treated the difficult products 
and tort liability issues stemming from the increase in automated 
technology.11 One commentator even advocates treating these 
vehicles no differently than a dog—as simple chattel.12 Few scholars, 
however, have treated the issue of criminal liability in a new world 
of AVs and self-driving cars.13 For example: If a vehicle has no 
driver but simply an “operator” (who is more a passenger than a 
driver), then who receives the ticket for a moving violation, such as 
passing a stop sign without stopping? Or, even more importantly, 
who—or what—is to be held responsible for vehicular homicide? 
Setting aside for a moment the questions of products liability, tort 
liability, and the deep ethical questions sometimes associated with 
vehicle technology,14 this Article endeavors to develop a framework 
for assigning criminal liability to parties involved in a violation of a 
state vehicle code. Specifically, it proposes that potential illegal acts 
should be treated distinctively through a new concept called products
culpability and should be divided into four categories: (1) simple 
 9. Technology advocates envision shared AV systems that reduce traffic, 
make travel safer, and enable effective ride sharing. See Ryan C. C. Chin, Driverless 
Cars—The Future of Transport in Cities?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 24, 2014, 7:41 
AM), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/driverless-vehicles-future-
car-sharing [https://perma.cc/JWC3-87KF]. 
 10. See Andrew Del-Colle, The 12 Most Important Questions About Self-
Driving Cars, POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.popularmechanics. 
com/cars/news/industry/the-12-most-important-questions-about-self-driving-cars-
16016418 [https://perma.cc/JWC3-87KF]. 
 11. See generally Funkhouser, supra note 7; Jeffrey K. Gurney, Sue My Car 
Not Me: Products Liability and Accidents Involving Autonomous Vehicles, 2013 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 247 (2013). 
 12. See generally Sophia H. Duffy & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Sit, Stay, 
Drive: The Future of Autonomous Car Liability, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 453, 
472 (2013). 
 13. As explained supra note 4 and infra Section II.A, there is a technical 
difference between AVs and self-driving cars. AVs range from cars with automatic 
braking to fully autonomous vehicles. Self-driving cars, however, are vehicles that 
operate as a normal automobile might, but the usual “driver” is simply a passenger 
who essentially pushes “go” after entering a destination. The term AV provides the 
broadest category and, for this analysis, will mean a self-driving car. See ANDERSON 
ET AL., supra note 6, at 2-3. 
 14. That is, some might raise questions about the appropriate action for a 
driver to take when faced with difficult situations, such as a “lesser-of-two-evils” 
decision. If one is unable to brake in sufficient time, does one crash into the vehicle 
ahead, putting passengers at risk? Or does one pull onto the sidewalk, putting 
pedestrians at risk? That ethical question will not be addressed as part of this Article. 
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civil infractions, the liability for which should remain with the 
human operator; (2) strict liability offenses, the liability for which 
should remain with the human operator subject to products liability 
indemnification actions; (3) intent-based crimes, the liability for 
which must depend on the existence of the requisite mens rea; and 
(4) negligent homicide crimes, in which the manufacturer may be 
liable depending on the facts of each case. 
Part I of this Article discusses the current state of common 
vehicle codes, using the Michigan code as an example of state 
vehicle law.15 Part II discusses the history and current state of AV 
technology, with a focus on current AV laws in several states. Part 
III discusses the corporate form and principles of agency. Part IV 
analyzes the interplay between AVs and the current vehicle code, 
ultimately proposing that criminal liability for AV operators and 
manufacturers should vary depending on the nature of the infraction. 
Before beginning the analysis, it should be noted that AV 
technology is a rapidly changing field, and state law is scrambling to 
keep up. In fact, as this Article has gone through the editing process, 
it has been amended multiple times in an attempt to reflect recent 
changes in the law. That said, new technology could become reality, 
and new bills could become laws before these words can be printed 
on a page. But that is the inherent risk of writing about law and 
technology, so this Article also attempts to answer a question that—
at least at the time of writing—remains unanswered: Who goes to jail 
when an AV kills someone? 
 15. See infra Part I. Michigan is an appropriate example state for several 
reasons. First, it is often regarded (at least in Michigan) as the birthplace of the 
modern automobile. Detroit is the “Motor City,” and it has a long history of 
automobile production and innovation. Michigan’s Automotive Industry Is Alive and 
Well, DETROIT REGIONAL CHAMBER, http://www.detroitchamber.com/econdev/ 
chamber-initiatives/michauto-universal-name/the-auto-industry-in-michigan/ [https:// 
perma.cc/KF96-8Z8X] (last visited Dec. 27, 2016). Secondly, the Michigan Vehicle 
Code is representative of other states’ vehicle codes, particularly in the Midwest. See 
generally; IND. CODE §§ 9-13-0.1-1 to 9-32-17-9 (2016); IOWA CODE §§ 321.1 to 
321.371 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 257.1 to 257.923 (2016); WIS. STAT.
§§ 346.01 to 346.95 (2016). Most drivers have little trouble when driving in a new 
state, presumably due in part to the consistency of the state vehicle codes. This 
Article does not include an exhaustive fifty state survey of state vehicle codes. 
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I. CURRENT STATE VEHICLE CODES
With the advent of the motor vehicle, states were tasked with 
the implementation of comprehensive vehicle codes.16 To regulate 
and manage the use of motor vehicles, most states enacted new, 
specific vehicle codes that govern particular elements of driver 
responsibility.17 In the Michigan Vehicle Code (MVC) for example, 
the law governs everything from moving violations,18 to failing to 
stop for a police vehicle,19 to using horse-drawn vehicles.20
Essentially, the “rules of the road” come from the MVC, and it is this 
code that governed AVs as well.21
Then, in December of 2016, the MVC got an update to usher in 
the age of AV technology. Through Senate Bill (S.B.) 995, Michigan 
passed one of the most permissive AV laws to date.22 In no uncertain 
terms, it says, “An automated motor vehicle may be operated on a 
street or highway in this state.”23 Prior to S.B. 995, the MVC held the 
exact opposite: “[A] person shall not operate an automated motor 
vehicle upon a highway or street in automatic mode.”24 Importantly, 
as addressed infra Part II, this law does not address criminal liability. 
So, for all of the questions the new provisions answered about AV 
development, it relies on the already-enacted provisions of the MVC 
to define and punish criminal activity that occurs behind the wheel—
or, in the case of an AV, behind the steering-wheel-less front 
compartment.25 Currently, operators of motor vehicles may be held to 
 16. The first of these codes was instituted in New York in 1903. See Carl
Watner, A Short History of Highway and Vehicle Regulations, 92 THE
VOLUNTARYIST 8, 6-7 (1998), http://voluntaryist.com/backissues/092.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7UDW-LGRM]. 
 17. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 1 to 42277 (West 1959); MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 257.1 to 257.923 (1949); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484A.005 to 484A.770 
(2011).
 18. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.601b (2011). 
 19. Id. § 257.602a. 
 20. Id. § 257.604. 
 21. Id. § 257.665. 
 22. Kirsten Korosec, Michigan Just Passed the Most Permissive Self-
Driving Car Laws in the Country, FORTUNE (Dec. 9, 2016, 7:32 PM),
http://fortune.com/2016/12/09/michigan-self-driving-cars. 
 23. S.B. 995 § 665(4), 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2016) (codified at
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.665(4) (West 2016) (emphasis added)).  
 24. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.663 (repealed 2016). 
 25. See Rich McCormick, Take a Look Inside Google’s Cute Little Self-
Driving Car, THE VERGE (Jul. 13, 2015, 8:15 PM), http://www.theverge.com/ 
2015/7/13/8955621/google-self-driving-car-pictures-interior.
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three different levels of liability under the MVC, each with 
increasingly severe penalties.26
A. Civil Infractions
Under the MVC, the lowest level of infraction for which a fine 
may be issued is called a civil infraction.27 According to the MVC, 
“‘[c]ivil infraction’ means an act or omission prohibited by law 
which is not a crime . . . and for which civil sanctions may be 
ordered.”28 These “civil infractions,” the section says, do not amount 
to “crimes,” which means that the state may levy only civil 
sanctions;29 that is, the violation’s severity falls below a 
misdemeanor and does not require that the accused be apprised of the 
same rights as under a criminal conviction.30 Examples of such 
violations include: disobeying “the instructions of a traffic control 
device”;31 failing to stop at a flashing red signal;32 and failing to 
move a vehicle from the scene of an accident.33
Importantly, these offenses do not contain any element of mens
rea.34 That is, no special mental state is required to find that the 
driver is guilty of failing to stop at a flashing red signal.35 Whether 
the driver was aware of the light or not, he or she may be found 
guilty of a civil violation.36 Though the MVC includes many 
exceptions and additional provisions, the state may generally punish 
civil infractions as follows:
If a person is determined under sections 741 to 750 to be responsible or 
responsible “with explanation” for a civil infraction under [the MVC] or a 
local ordinance substantially corresponding to a provision of [the MVC], 
 26. Id. § 257.601b(1)-(3) (indicating civil infractions, misdemeanors, and 
felonies).
 27. Id. § 257.6a. 
 28. Id.
 29. Id.
 30. These offenses do not meet the elements of “crime” as defined by 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.5 (1931); Civil Infraction, redirected to Infraction,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 31. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.611(1) (2016). 
 32. See id. § 257.614(1)(a). 
 33. See id. § 257.618a. 
 34. See id. § 257.614(2) (mandating that “[a] person who violates this 
section is responsible for a civil infraction”). This indicates that no intent, or mens
rea, is required to find the actor guilty of the violation. 
 35. See id. § 257.614(1)(a); infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. 
 36. For a detailed discussion of the concept of mens rea, see infra Section 
I.C.
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the judge or district court magistrate may order the person to pay a civil 
fine of not more than $100.00 and costs as provided in subsection (4).37
With a maximum penalty of $100.00 plus actual costs, the 
MVC treats civil infractions much less severely than strict-liability or 
intent-based crimes.38
B. Strict-Liability Crimes 
Moving beyond simple civil crimes and into criminal 
violations, the MVC punishes strict-liability crimes as a second 
category of violations.39 To be found guilty of a crime under the 
MVC,40 or for any other crime, the operator must satisfy the statutory 
elements of the criminal offense.41 Most basically, the actor must 
meet the required actus reus and mens rea of the offense. Actus reus 
consists of an act that has a causal link to the created harm, “with 
actus expressing the voluntary physical movement . . . and reus
expressing the fact that this conduct results in a certain proscribed 
harm.”42 That is, to be found criminally liable, the alleged perpetrator 
must act, and the act must cause the avoided harm.43 The actus reus 
typically provides the easiest element to satisfy because truly 
 37. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.907 (2015). Subsection (4) provides, in part: 
If a civil fine is ordered under subsection (2) or (3), the judge or district 
court magistrate shall summarily tax and determine the costs of the 
action, which are not limited to the costs taxable in ordinary civil 
actions, and may include all expenses, direct and indirect, to which the 
plaintiff has been put in connection with the civil infraction, up to the 
entry of judgment.  
Id. § 257.907(4). 
 38. See infra Sections I.B-C. 
 39. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.8 (2016). 
 40. Some statutes contain mens rea elements, while others do not. Compare
id. § 257.625(2) (mandating: “The owner of a vehicle or a person in charge or in 
control of a vehicle shall not authorize or knowingly permit the vehicle to be 
operated upon a highway”) (emphasis added), with id. § 257.625(1) (requiring: “A 
person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other 
place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles . . . if the 
person is operating while intoxicated”). Note the absence of any mens rea
requirement in the second statute. See infra note 46. 
 41. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 127 
(5th ed. 2009). 
 42. Albin Eser, The Principle of “Harm” in the Concept of Crime: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQ. L. REV.
345, 386 (1966). 
 43. See id.
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involuntary acts are rare.44 For strict liability crimes, the court need 
find only that the act by the perpetrator was voluntary because, 
arguably, there is no mens rea required.45
Some courts, including Michigan’s Court of Appeals, hold that 
strict-liability offenses are generally disfavored, but each statute 
must be interpreted to find the requisite level of mens rea intended.46
That is, a court may typically presume that the statute intends a level 
of mens rea, but the court must individually analyze legislative intent 
to determine whether the legislature in fact intended a strict-liability 
crime.47 For purposes of the MVC, crimes that lack the mens rea
element are likely strict-liability crimes, and they are punishable as 
either felonies or misdemeanors.48
According to the Michigan Penal Code, a misdemeanor is “any 
act or omission, not a felony, [that] is punishable according to law, 
by a fine, penalty or forfeiture, and imprisonment,” or when the act is 
not a felony but may be punished similarly according to the court’s 
discretion.49 Examples of strict-liability misdemeanors under the 
MVC include: committing a moving violation50 in a work or school 
 44. For example, a third-party would have to physically move the actor to 
assault another person to constitute an involuntary act. See Melissa Hamilton, 
Reinvigorating Actus Reus: The Case for Involuntary Actions by Veterans with 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 340, 341, 345-46 (2011). 
 45. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); Liability,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 46. People v. Nasir, 662 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). However, as 
the Michigan Court of Appeals said in Nasir, “[a]s with all questions of statutory 
interpretation, when determining whether a statute imposes strict liability, [the 
court’s] primary goal is to determine and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.” Id. As 
a general principle, a mens rea element required in other sections of the same law 
may indicate a strict liability offense where the mens rea element is conspicuously 
missing. See DRESSLER, supra note 41, at 176-77 n.1. 
 47. See Nasir, 662 N.W.2d at 31. 
 48. In examining Michigan’s Vehicle Code, it is difficult to determine 
whether the court would find that every statute lacking a mens rea constitutes a 
strict-liability crime. See supra note 46. However, the requisite mens rea is often 
defined in other sections of the MVC. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.602a 
(2016). As noted above, supra note 46, this likely indicates strict liability for moving 
violations and simple civil violations. See DRESSLER, supra note 41, at 176. For 
purposes of this Article, it is assumed that courts would interpret statutes lacking the 
mens rea element to intend strict liability. 
 49. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.8 (2016). 
 50. Moving violation is defined as: “[A]n act or omission prohibited under 
this act or a local ordinance substantially corresponding to this act that occurs while 
a person is operating a motor vehicle, and for which the person is subject to a fine.” 
Id. § 257.601b(5)(b). 
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zone that “causes injury to another person” in that zone;51 operating a 
motor vehicle while over the legal limit of blood alcohol content;52
and failing to take adequate precautions when approaching a disabled 
pedestrian in a crosswalk.53
The Michigan Penal Code then goes on to define felony, 
saying, “[t]he term ‘felony’ when used in this act, shall be construed 
to mean an offense for which the offender, on conviction may be 
punished by death, or by imprisonment in state prison.”54 Examples 
of such strict-liability felonies are: committing a moving violation in 
a work or school zone that “as a result causes death to another 
person” in that zone;55 using a device that jams police radar;56 and 
failing to properly avoid a stopped emergency vehicle.57 These 
crimes serve as important examples of the problem surrounding the 
technology; it remains unclear whether AVs can actually commit 
such crimes.58 A more complicated question arises, though: can AVs, 
as machines, have intent?59
C. Intent-Based Crimes 
The last, and most complicated, set of crimes for which the 
operator of a vehicle may be convicted is the corpus of intent-based 
crimes.60 The statute upon which such an infraction is based indicates 
the requirement of a certain mens rea, or mental state.61 The mens rea
element is typically divided into four possible levels: purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.62 Purpose requires the most 
forethought and intentional action, knowledge requires practical 
certainty of a result from known circumstances, recklessness 
 51. Id. § 257.601b(2) (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. § 257.625(1)(b). 
 53. See id. § 257.612(4). 
 54. Id. § 750.7. 
 55. Id. § 257.601b(3) (emphasis added). 
 56. Id. § 257.616a(1)(b). 
 57. See id. § 257.653a. 
 58. See infra Part IV. 
 59. See generally A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59
MIND 433, 433 (1950), http://phil415.pbworks.com/f/TuringComputing.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5NMR-BDDE] (discussing “the answer to the question, ‘Can machines 
think?’”). 
 60. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.625(2) (2014) (prohibiting the 
owner of a vehicle from knowingly allowing his vehicle to be operated by an 
intoxicated driver). 
 61. Id. 
 62. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
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involves acting in disregard of a known risk, and negligence requires 
only a gross deviation from the conduct of a reasonable person.63 By 
indicating a mens rea in certain provisions of the MVC but not in 
others, the legislature may have indicated their intent that violations 
lacking a mens rea requirement are meant to be strict liability 
offenses.64
Intent-based infractions in the MVC include: “willfully” failing 
to obey a signal given by a police officer in the course of his duties;65
“knowingly” operating the vehicle on a highway if the operator is 
over the legal limit of blood alcohol content;66 and “knowingly 
permit to be driven or moved on a highway a vehicle or combination 
of vehicles that is in such an unsafe condition as to endanger a 
person.”67 While the statutes are relatively clear for such crimes, 
omission on the part of the operator will add a significant complexity 
to the issue of intent-based crimes.68 As the Model Penal Code 
mandates, actors may be found liable for an omission where either 
(1) the omission is made criminal by statute, or (2) the actor fails to 
act where a legal duty has been imposed.69
These specific-intent crimes form the crux of the complexity 
surrounding AV criminal liability. Although S.B. 995 does not 
define criminal liability, it does define who the “driver or operator” 
is: the “automated driving system allowing for operation without a 
human operator shall be considered the driver or operator of a 
vehicle for purposes of determining conformance to any applicable 
traffic or motor vehicle laws,” it says.70 So the system itself is the 
operator. S.B. 995 goes on to define “automated driving system” as 
“hardware and software that are collectively capable of performing 
all aspects of the dynamic driving task for a vehicle on a part-time or 
full-time basis without any supervision by a human operator.”71 Note 
 63. See id. § 2.02(2)(a)-(d). 
 64. See text accompanying supra notes 46-49; People v. Nasir, 662 N.W.2d 
29, 32 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that “[e]xamples of such strict-liability 
offenses include narcotics laws, traffic laws, adulterated food or drug laws, criminal 
nuisances, and liquor control laws”). 
 65. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.602a(1) (2016). 
 66. Id. § 257.625(2)(a)-(b). 
 67. Id. § 257.683(1). 
 68. See MODEL PENAL CODE. § 2.01(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
 69. Id.  
 70. S.B. 995 § 665(5), 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2016) (codified at
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.665(5) (West 2016)). 
 71. Id. § 2b(1) (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.2b(1) (West 
2016)).
108 Michigan State Law Review  2017 
that the system must be capable of “performing all aspects” of the 
driving task without the human operator.  
Because state laws will continue to evolve differently to 
accommodate the new world of AVs, each state legislature and state 
supreme court must analyze their own intent-based and strict-liability 
offenses to decide how amicable they intend to be toward the 
“operators” of AVs—whether those operators are people or 
machines.72 The specifics of each state code will surely vary, even 
given the fact that state vehicle codes share many similarities when 
addressing criminal liability.73 In deciding the liability issues 
surrounding AVs, then, the courts and legislatures must resolve 
whether AVs have an ability to “knowingly” do something, whether 
the AV or the human operator will be liable for civil and criminal 
infractions, and, most importantly, how the law will evolve to reflect 
these policy decisions.74
D. Putting It All Together: Criminal Homicide Under the Model 
Penal Code 
That short survey of relevant traffic laws brings us to the most 
complex issue: liability when an AV kills a human being. Homicide, 
like most criminal behavior, is defined and punished differently by 
each state.75 This renders any sweeping generalizations about “the 
criminal law” in the United States largely inaccurate.76 Referenced 
above,77 the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code (MPC) 
provides some standards that have been widely accepted across the 
50 states.78 Accordingly, in examining “the criminal law,” this 
Article will discuss homicide as described in the MPC, referring to 
Michigan as the example state where appropriate.79
 72. For a good analysis of strict liability offenses, see Richard A. 
Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 732-34 
(1960).
 73. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 74. See infra Subsection IV.C.3.
 75. Paul H. Robinson & Markus Dirk Dubber, An Introduction to the Model 
Penal Code 1, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL (Mar. 12, 199), 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EAW9-XY5Y]. 
 76. Id.
 77. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 78. Robinson, supra note 75, at 1-2. 
 79. See supra note 15 (explaining why Michigan is an appropriate example 
state). 
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The MPC defines three kinds of homicide, each requiring a 
different level of intent.80 Generally speaking, killing a person is 
“criminal homicide,” and one is guilty of that crime “if he purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another 
human being.”81 Homicide rises to the level of murder when 
“committed purposely or knowingly; or [when] . . . committed 
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to 
the value of human life.”82 Such a murder is a first-degree felony, 
punishable by death in some jurisdictions.83
When the perpetrator does not maintain intent amounting to 
purposely or knowingly, the killing is either manslaughter or 
negligent homicide.84 Manslaughter is homicide committed 
recklessly, and it is punishable as a second-degree felony.85
Negligent homicide, however, requires only a showing of 
negligence, and it constitutes a felony in the third degree.86 Though 
these standards seem relatively straightforward, the terms used 
therein—purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently—bring
significant complication. 
As discussed briefly in Part I, the MPC defines each of these 
levels of culpability, beginning with purposely. A person acts 
purposely when “it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of 
that nature or to cause such a result” and he is aware of the 
“attendant circumstances” that satisfy the other elements of the 
offense.87 An attendant circumstance is simply an element that forms 
the basis of an offense.88 For example, to be guilty of homicide, one 
must actually kill a “human being.”89 The victim’s status as a “human 
being” is the attendant circumstance that forms the basis of the crime 
in the first place.90
Second, someone acts knowingly when he knows that the 
attendant circumstance exists, and “he is aware that it is practically 
certain that his conduct will cause such a result.”91 The difference 
 80. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).  
 81. Id.
 82. Id. at § 210.2(1). 
 83. Id. at § 210.2(2). 
 84. Id. at § 210.3-4. 
 85. Id. at § 210.3. 
 86. Id. at § 210.4. 
 87. Id. at § 2.02(2)(a). 
 88. See id. at § 1.13(9). 
 89. See id. at § 210.1.
 90. See id. at § 1.13(9). 
 91. Id. at § 2.02(2)(b). 
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between purposely and knowingly is subtle. Purposely requires that 
the actor intend the specific result, and knowingly requires that the 
actor be aware that his conduct will result in particular harm.92 For 
example, someone might put a bomb on an airplane, intending to kill 
two of the passengers on that plane.93 But the bomber also knows that 
the other 98 passengers will be killed in the explosion.94 So the 
bomber acts purposely toward the two people by intending that those 
two be killed, but acts only knowingly toward the other 98 people, 
knowing that the explosion will kill them, too.95
On the other hand, acting recklessly requires only that the 
perpetrator “consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk . . . [that] involves a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s 
situation.”96 For example, walking into a classroom and shooting a 
gun over the heads of the students, purportedly trying to hit the clock 
in the back of the room, would be reckless if the shooter knew there 
was a substantial risk of harm.97 This would be a gross deviation 
from a law-abiding person’s standard of conduct. 
Finally, the MPC indicates that a person acts negligently “when 
he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
material element exists or will result from his conduct” and his 
failure to perceive the risk grossly deviates from the standard of a 
reasonable person.98 This differs from recklessness in that the 
negligent person need not “consciously disregard” the risk.99 Even if 
the actor does not know the risk of his action, he may be found liable 
for negligent homicide by grossly deviating from the standard of a 
reasonable person.100
Because this Article will continue to discuss the Michigan 
Motor Vehicle Code (MVC), it is necessary to return to Michigan 
law for a moment. Michigan courts recognize negligent homicide as 
 92. Id. at § 2.02(2)(a)-(b). 
 93. This example comes from Model Penal Code Mens Rea, NAT’L
PARALEGAL COLL. (2017), https://nationalparalegal.edu/public_documents/ 
courseware_asp_files/criminalLaw/basicElements/ModelPenalCodeMensRea.asp  
[https://perma.cc/ 64XP-7MP7]. 
 94. Id.
 95. Id.
 96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c).  
 97. This example comes from a Criminal Law class by Barbara O’Brien, 
Associate Professor of Law, at the Michigan State University College of Law. 
 98. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d). 
 99. Id. at § 2.02(c). 
 100. Id. at § 2.02(d). 
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manslaughter. In People v. Richardson, the Michigan Supreme Court 
defined involuntary manslaughter as “the killing of another without 
malice and unintentionally, but in doing some unlawful act not 
amounting to a felony nor naturally tending to cause death or great 
bodily harm, or in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or by 
the negligent omission to perform a legal duty.”101 A person found 
guilty of manslaughter may be sentenced to fifteen years in prison, 
fined up to $7,500, or both.102 Moreover, the MVC imposes a $1,000 
“driver responsibility” fee in addition to any other criminal charges 
levied for manslaughter or negligent homicide.103
But even with such specific guidance, applying the law to AVs 
is not clear. So in light of those standards and other state-specific 
laws, legislatures need to enact policies and legislation to govern 
exactly what happens if and when an AV causes a fatal accident. 
After discussing more of the history and jurisprudence surrounding 
automated technology, this Article provides a solution.104
II. CURRENT AVS AND AV LAWS
AV technology is continually developing,105 with estimates of 
consumer-ready vehicles ranging from next year to five years from 
now.106 Automation in cars can be something as simple as cruise 
control, as advanced as full automation, or something in-between—
like adaptive cruise control.107 The most complicated legal issues 
 101. People v. Richardson, 293 N.W.2d 332, 336 (Mich. 1980) (quoting 
People v. Townes, 218 N.W.2d 136, 141 (Mich. 1974)), modified on other grounds,
People v. Beach, 418 N.W.2d 861, 870 n.9 (Mich. 1988). 
 102. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.321. 
 103. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.732a(2)(a)(i). 
 104. See infra Part IV. 
 105. For a good history of AV technology, see Rachael Roseman, Note, 
When Autonomous Vehicles Take Over the Road: Rethinking the Expansion of the 
Fourth Amendment in a Technology-Driven World, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4-11 
(2014).
 106. See Katie Nelson, Self-Driving Cars Will Hit UK Roads in 2015,
MASHABLE (July 30, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/07/30/self-driving-cars-uk 
[https://perma.cc/GNE7-ZCM8]. But see Brian Leon, Google’s Self-Driving Car 
May Be Further Away Than You Think, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 2, 2014, 11:37 
AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/autos/google-self-driving-car-article-1.1924691 
[https://perma.cc/E2FE-M6A8]. 
 107. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 2-3; Karim Nice, How Cruise 
Control Systems Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://auto.howstuffworks.com/cruise-
control4.htm [https://perma.cc/XL77-DGH9 ] (last visited Dec. 27, 2016) (noting 
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involve fully automated technology.108 By promising that the AV 
technology will take control of the vehicle, manufacturers also 
impliedly promise that the AV will follow relevant traffic laws.109
A. AVs: History and Technology 
Though vehicles may now be self-driving,110 their history began 
with simpler roots. Beginning with the 1939 World’s Fair,111 the 
promise of AVs grew to an international competition in 2004: the 
DARPA Grand Challenge.112 This challenge was meant to increase 
the safety of soldiers in combat.113 One year later, five AVs 
completed a 150-mile course using only self-guiding technologies 
for the first time.114 Now, ten years later, multiple big manufacturers 
are producing prototypes and fully functioning AVs to compete in a 
global market.115
Modern, fully self-driving vehicles require a complex system 
of advanced technology to effectively operate.116 To maintain their 
position on the road and avoid crashes, AVs use GPS systems, map 
data, sensors, and cameras.117 Most significantly, modern AVs use a 
technology called Light Detection and Ranging, or LiDAR, which 
perceives and draws a virtual map of the vehicle’s surroundings.118
This LiDAR unit proves valuable, as it identifies pedestrians, stop 
that adaptive cruise control recognizes vehicles around the principal vehicle and 
slows or accelerates to accommodate those other vehicles). 
 108. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 3 (describing Level 4 AV 
technology). 
 109. See Heather Kelly, Driverless Car Tech Gets Serious at CES, CNN
(Apr. 7, 2014, 8:53 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/09/tech/innovation/self-
driving-cars-ces [https://perma.cc/3YNL-9JNA]. 
 110. Vehicles that are fully self-driving are still in a testing phase. See
WAYMO, supra note 5.  
 111. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 1.
 112. See Roseman, supra note 105, at 5. 
 113. Id.
 114. Id. at 5-6. 
 115. See Bruce Kennedy, Top 5 Companies for Autonomous Vehicle 
Technology, BENZINGA (July 25, 2014, 10:36 AM), http://www.benzinga.com/ 
general/travel/14/07/4728393/top-5-companies-for-autonomous-vehicle-technology 
[https://perma.cc/QE6R-T7X9]. 
 116. See Del-Colle, supra note 10 (describing the hardware and software that 
control an AV on the road). 
 117. See Andrew P. Garza, Note, “Look Ma, No Hands!”: Wrinkles and 
Wrecks in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 581, 587-88 
(2012).
 118. Id. 
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signs, other vehicles, and surrounding objects.119 By putting together 
these technologies, AVs are able to interact with their surroundings 
in an entirely novel way.120 These vehicles see everything that a 
driver would see, but they do so more quickly and more effectively 
than a human would.121
Surprisingly, Google has already released a self-driving 
prototype, which it showcased to the public in 2014.122 Daimler-AG, 
Mercedes Benz, and Audi have also secured permits to test their 
vehicles on the road in California under a California law that allows 
testing on public roads.123 Tesla, known for its advanced electric-
vehicle technology, is also implementing advanced AV 
technology.124 Amazingly, it is doing so with a software update 
pushed to its current fleet of vehicles over the air.125 As AV 
technology continues to develop, the timeline for viability may 
continue to change, providing little certainty about what the future 
holds.126 To be sure, automation will progress at different stages.127
 119. Id.
 120. See Del-Colle, supra note 10 (describing the ability of the AV to 
maintain its own lane, steer, brake, and accelerate). 
 121. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at xiv. 
 122. See WAYMO, supra note 5. 
 123. Carl Franzen, Google’s Self-Driving Cars and Others Get Permits to 
Drive in California, THE VERGE (Sept. 22, 2014, 2:44 PM), http://www.theverge. 
com/2014/9/22/6828161/california-permits-self-driving-cars-google-audi-mercedes-
benz [https://perma.cc/6UNR-S5HH]. 
 124. Rhett Jones, Tesla to Take Its Biggest Step Toward Fully Autonomous 
Cars Tomorrow, GIZMODO (Jan. 8, 2017, 1:42 PM), http://gizmodo.com/tesla-to-
take-its-biggest-step-toward-fully-autonomous-1790950298. 
 125. Id.
 126. Danielle Muoio, Automakers Are Slowing Their Self-Driving Car 
Plans—and That’s a Good Thing, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 8, 2017, 3:01 PM), http:// 
www.businessinsider.com/self-driving-cars-not-feasible-in-5-years-automakers-say-
2017-1 (noting that “at this year’s Consumer Electronics Show, Toyota pushed back 
on the idea that we are just a few years off from an autonomous reality. ‘I need to 
make it perfectly clear, [full autonomy is] a wonderful, wonderful goal. But none of 
us in the automobile or IT industries are close to achieving true Level 5 autonomy. 
We are not even close,’ Gill Pratt, the CEO of the Toyota Research Institute, said at 
CES.”); see also Steve Hanley, NASA and Nissan Team Up for Autonomous Cars,
GAS2.ORG (Jan. 16, 2015), http://gas2.org/2015/01/16/nasa-and-nissan-team-up-for-
autonomous-cars [https://perma.cc/KY6Z-P64H] (noting that “NASA is embarking 
on an ambitious five-year program”) (emphasis added). 
 127. See Joann Muller, Baby Steps Toward Driverless Cars Deliver Huge 
Leaps in Safety, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2014, 2:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/joannmuller/2014/09/11/baby-steps-toward-driverless-cars-deliver-huge-leaps-
in-safety/ [https://perma.cc/LJX2-Y2TZ]. 
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For example, a “driverless car”128 is one in which there is no human 
operator to push “go” in the vehicle; the vehicle may be pre-
programmed, for example, to pick up a child from school with no 
human operator present.129 This may still be a distant dream.130 A 
self-driving car, however, is much more plausible in the near future 
and promises, instead, to take over the basic operations of the 
vehicle, while the passenger fully relinquishes control.131 As AV 
technology develops, so too will the laws governing it.132
Recently, with major manufacturers entering the automated 
technology industry,133 states have begun passing laws that allow 
testing of AVs on the roads.134 In this preliminary stage, legislation 
will necessarily evolve. Current laws135 allow only testing of the 
vehicles on the road, and human operators may engage the automatic 
features only when the operator is able to quickly regain control in 
the event of an emergency.136 These laws have garnered some 
criticism from supporters of AVs who call for legislation allowing 
for consumer operation and utilization of AVs on the road.137 Even 
more unexplored, however, is the legal realm of AV case law.138
 128. This Article will not discuss driverless cars. Such technology, it seems, 
is the promise of the AV technology extended to a technological (and imaginative) 
extreme. 
 129. See id. (“There’s a difference between fully autonomous cars that drive 
themselves, and highly automated vehicles, which can take over driving under 
certain conditions, like stop-and-go traffic, or long road trips.”). 
 130. Supra note 126. 
 131. See id. (“[T]he Japanese engineer in the driver’s seat kept his hands 
about an inch off the wheel during the entire demo, and when traffic ahead suddenly 
slowed, he didn’t wait for the automatic braking feature to kick in.”). 
 132. See Gabriel Weiner & Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving: 
Legislative and Regulatory Action, CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOC’Y, http:// 
cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/Automated_Driving:_Legislative_and_Regulatory_
Action [https://perma.cc/5RZ3-HBFS] (last visited Dec. 27, 2016) (maintaining a list 
of current AV laws). 
 133. See Kennedy, supra note 115. 
 134. For a good list of such states, see Weiner & Walker Smith, supra note 
132.
 135. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.665 (2014). 
 136. See Andrew R. Swanson, “Somebody Grab the Wheel!”: State 
Autonomous Vehicle Legislation and the Road to a National Regime, 97 MARQ. L.
REV. 1085, 1096-99 (2014) (explaining the development of legislation). 
 137. See Melissa Anders, Autonomous Vehicle Testing Now Allowed Under 
Michigan Law, MLIVE (Dec. 27, 2013, 1:19 PM), http://www.mlive.com/politics/ 
index.ssf/2013/12/autonomous_vehicle_testing_now.html [https://perma.cc/KMG2-
W4CE]. 
 138. See infra Section II.B. 
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B. Unchartered Territory: AV Technology Case Law 
Case law proves to be particularly unhelpful in the analysis of 
AVs. With the lack of fully operational AVs on the road currently, 
no laws—and consequently cases—have dealt with criminal liability 
for the human operators of these machines.139 The focus must thus 
shift to how courts treat other, similar technologies.140 The courts 
have dealt with several such technologies, including both GPS and 
autopilot technologies.141
1. Rosenberg v. Harwood
Google proves to be a leader in the race to put AVs on the road 
for consumers.142 It is thus fitting that Google’s other technology 
provides the most apt analogy for liability in AVs.143 The analogy 
comes from a little-known case from Utah’s third judicial district: 
Rosenberg v. Harwood.144 In Rosenberg, the plaintiff was using a 
Google GPS when she began walking down a busy street.145 Upon 
getting injured,146 she sued Google—asserting four causes of 
action147—essentially claiming that the GPS unit was defective for its 
intended purpose; it should have warned her of the danger inherent in 
walking down the street.148
The court found that Google did not owe the plaintiff a duty, 
because the two parties had not established a “contractual or 
 139. See Funkhouser, supra note 7, at 439-40.  
 140. For an interesting discussion of the analogous problem of unmanned 
drone use, see generally J. Tyler Black, Over Your Head, Under the Radar: An 
Examination of Changing Legislation, Aging Case Law, and Possible Solutions to 
the Domestic Police Drone Puzzle, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1829 (2013). 
 141. See infra Subsections II.B.1-2. 
 142. Ben Axelson, Google Shows Off Self-Driving Car that Could Be on the 
Road in 5 Years, SYRACUSE.COM (Oct. 28, 2014, 11:07 AM), http://www.syracuse. 
com/news/index.ssf/2014/10/google_self-driving_car.html [https://perma.cc/E8JK-N38J]. 
 143. Id. (noting that Google wants to lead the AV initiative). 
 144. Rosenberg v. Harwood, No. 100916536, slip op. at 1 (Utah 3d. Jud. 
Dist. Ct. May 27, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/06/injured_ 
pedestr.htm [https://perma.cc/6XGZ-BDFR] (to access the pdf and corresponding 
pagination used in this note, follow the “pdf” link near the top of the page in 
brackets after the case citation near the top of the page). 
 145. Id. 
 146. The plaintiff was walking across a rural highway, onto which the GPS 
unit had led her. The opinion does not give the details of the street or her injury. Id.
 147. She sued for general negligence, failure to warn, strict liability-
defective design, and strict liability-failure to warn. Id.
 148. Id. 
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fiduciary relationship” that would give rise to Google’s duty to warn 
the plaintiff not to walk down a street unfit for pedestrians.149 The 
court further said, “[E]stablishing a special relationship likely 
requires a plaintiff in a case such as this to show that the defendant 
‘deprive[d] the [plaintiff] of his normal opportunities for 
protection.’”150 Because the GPS simply provided an added benefit 
without depriving the plaintiff of her existing protections, the court 
found in favor of Google.151 Although the plaintiff in Rosenberg
found no favor with the court in Utah, other courts have heard cases 
involving technology more similar to AV technology: airplane 
autopilot systems.152
2. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp.
The autopilot function in modern airplanes may also provide an 
adequate analogy, considering that AVs arguably employ a form of 
automobile autopilot.153 Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp. involves 
airplane autopilot technology, and the court offered an analysis of 
manufacturer liability.154 In Glorvigen, the plaintiff pilot’s estate 
brought a suit against the manufacturer of the autopilot technology,155
alleging a failure to properly train the pilot on the use of the autopilot 
technology.156
The court, echoing a decision by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, adopted the reasoning of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
which mandates that “[o]ne who supplies directly or through a third 
person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability . . . for 
physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for 
 149. Id. at 3.
 150. Id. at 3 n.5 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) (AM.
LAW INST. 1965)). 
 151. Id. at 3, 9-10.
 152. See, e.g., Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 542, 544 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
 153. See Muller, supra note 127. 
 154. See Glorvigen, 796 N.W.2d at 544. 
 155. According to an expert witness:  
[A]n autopilot will do a lot of good things for the pilot of an aircraft 
depending on the capabilities of that particular autopilot and this one is a 
very good one. In its most basic form, it will keep the wings level. It will 
also maintain a heading across the ground and it will maintain altitude if 
it’s all programmed properly to do that. 
Id. at 547. 
 156. Id. at 546. 
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which and by a person for whose use it is supplied.”157 This liability 
attaches if the supplier: (1) has actual or constructive knowledge that 
“the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is 
supplied;” (2) “has no reason to believe” that the users of the chattel 
recognize that danger; and (3) “fails to exercise reasonable care to 
inform” the users of the chattel that its use will be dangerous in the 
relevant use.158 In analyzing the claim pursuant to this standard, the 
court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief for two 
reasons.159 First, the manufacturer of the airplane did not have a duty 
to train the pilot in the use of the autopilot technology because the 
training given to the plaintiff was “ancillary training” and therefore 
outside of the scope of the defendant’s duty.160 Secondly, in a more 
technical argument, the court held that the negligence claim 
amounted to a claim of “educational malpractice,” an action barred 
by state law.161 The court thus made clear that the manufacturer of a 
sophisticated technology, even one that purports to fly an airplane on 
autopilot, may not be held liable for failing to adequately162 train the 
operator on its use.163 AV technology manufacturers will face the 
same issues regarding the adequacy of warnings, with the added 
potential liability incurred when the product autonomously breaks 
the law.164
 157. Id. at 550 (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (AM. LAW
INST. 1965)).
 158. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388). 
 159. Id. at 551, 555. 
 160. Id. at 551-52 (holding that “we find no support in the law for 
respondents’ proposition that Cirrus’s duty to warn included an obligation to train 
Prokop to proficiently pilot the SR22—which is the crux of respondents’ claims”). 
 161. Id. at 555 (holding that “[o]ur conclusion that the claims are barred 
under the educational-malpractice doctrine forecloses relief under the other liability 
theories asserted by respondents”). 
 162. At issue in this case is training the pilot to proficiency in the use of the 
technology. Presumably, the lack of “proficient” training led to the deaths of the 
pilots. Notably, the court maintained that manufacturers, though they have a duty to 
warn, have no duty to train users to the level of proficiency. Id. at 552 (noting, 
“respondents’ contention that the duty to warn by providing adequate instructions 
for safe use includes an obligation to train the end user to proficiency is 
unprecedented”).  
 163. Id. at 552, 558.  
 164. See infra Section II.C. 
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C. Products Liability in a Criminal Framework  
AVs, like human-operated automobiles and airplanes, will 
likely face products liability actions.165 Currently, products liability 
suits are based on harm to the user caused by a defect in the 
product.166 Such a defect may be in the manufacturing of the product, 
the product’s design, or a failure to affix on the product adequate 
warnings regarding its use.167 The Restatement (Third) of Torts 
defines products liability: “One engaged in the business of selling or 
otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective 
product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused 
by the defect.”168 As these suits involve making the user whole after 
injury to a person or property resulting from harm caused by the 
product, they do not hold the product manufacturer liable for 
criminal violations incurred by the operator while using the 
product.169 In other words, manufacturers are liable only when there 
has been harm to persons or property, so liability does not include 
monetary loss from a fine or monetary penalty.170 Products liability is 
a complicated field of study, and at least one commentator, Kevin 
Funkhouser, has considered how products liability will attach to the 
complicated systems behind AVs.171 Funkhouser notes “how ill-
prepared products liability law is and the potential consequences to 
both manufacturers and potential plaintiffs,”172 but also that “there 
are many instances where [manufacturing defect] claims may be well 
equipped to deal with [AVs]” such as the faulty installation of a 
radar sensor.173 Ultimately, though, “[p]laintiffs will be limited in the 
claims that they can bring relating to autonomous vehicles,”174
 165. See generally Funkhouser, supra note 7. 
 166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (AM. LAW
INST. 1998). 
 167. Id. at § 2. 
 168. Id. at § 1. 
 169. The Restatement (Third) of Torts holds manufacturers liable for harm to 
person or property and for economic loss due to injury. Id. at § 1 cmt. d. This 
“harm” does not include monetary loss from a fine or citation, as it includes only the 
economic loss suffered due to the actual physical injury. Id. at § 21 cmt. b.  
 170. Id. at § 1 cmt. d. 
 171. See generally Funkhouser, supra note 7. 
 172. Id. at 440. 
 173. Id. at 453. 
 174. Id. at 458. 
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particularly because no cause of action exists to recover criminal 
penalties from a product defect.175
No case law seems to indicate that product manufacturers are 
held liable for the fines incurred by users of the product, presumably 
because all products require user input to perform illegal acts; the 
user generally causes the harm and thus may not recover.176 For 
example, media piracy through Internet downloads does not make 
the computer manufacturer liable to media producers simply because 
the computer was used in downloading the material.177 AVs, 
however, promise to be self-driving and to act without user control, 
thus vitiating the user’s apparent fault.178 To date, it seems that one 
brand of a police-radar scanner is the only product that reimburses 
the user for a criminal fine imposed during its use.179 Even in that 
unusual situation, however, the company offers the reimbursement; 
the law does not compel it.180 Thus, the usual products liability 
framework fails, as it does not account for the unusual relationship 
between AVs and their operators.181 To solve the apparent gap in 
available causes of action, then, courts must look to corporate 
criminal liability. 
III. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: CAN THE CORPORATE 
PERSON BE A CRIMINAL?
With the majority of AV manufacturers being corporations, it is 
imperative to understand how exactly a corporation might be held 
 175. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (AM.
LAW INST. 1998); supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 176. See, e.g., Software Enforcement and the U.S. Law, THE SOFTWARE 
ALLIANCE, http://www.bsa.org/anti-piracy/tools-page/software-piracy-and-the-law 
[https://perma.cc/H7HH-78LU] (last visited Dec. 27, 2016) (noting that consumers 
are liable for copyright infringement after “pirating” media); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 17(a) (providing for a reduction in recovery of 
damages “if the conduct of the plaintiff combines with the product defect to cause 
the harm”). 
 177. See THE SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 176.  
 178. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 3 (describing the fullest level of 
automation). 
 179. See The K40 Five-Star Guarantee, K40 ELECTRONICS, http://www.k40. 
com/products/ticket-free-guarantee/ [https://perma.cc/GJ3V-XKHD] (last visited 
Dec. 27, 2016) (promising to pay the fine on a speeding ticket received while using 
the police radar scanner technology). 
 180. See id.
 181. See Funkhouser, supra note 7, at 458 (explaining that “[t]he technology 
is novel and complex”). 
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criminally liable at all. While it remains unclear whether a particular 
AV may commit a crime,182 one must also consider a preliminary 
issue regarding the nature of a corporation as a person: can a 
corporation commit—and be held liable for—a crime? Particularly 
when the newest state legislation mandates that the automated 
system itself is the “driver or operator”?183 Because AVs fit poorly 
within the products liability framework,184 the manufacturer-
corporations of these machines could instead be held criminally 
liable for the crimes committed during their use, particularly when 
those AVs act as agents of the corporation.185
A. Agency Action: The Structure of a Corporation 
As early as 1819, the United States Supreme Court recognized 
and defined a corporation: “It is, in short, an artificial person, 
existing in contemplation of law, and endowed with certain powers 
and franchises which . . . are yet considered as subsisting in the 
corporation itself, as distinctly as if it were a real personage.”186 As 
an artificial person, the corporation may sue on behalf of—and be 
sued by—its own members, and it may also freely contract with 
those members as it would with other entities.187 As the principles of 
the corporation have developed, so too has the concept of corporate 
criminal liability, with corporate criminal liability being a relatively 
new legal concept.188 Because of its recent advent, and quite 
problematically, corporate criminal law “has proceeded largely 
without reference to any intelligible body of principle,” leaving the 
question of corporate criminal liability for AV technology 
unanswered.189
To evolve the principle more effectively, the most recent 
Model Penal Code offers criteria for corporate criminal liability.190 A 
 182. See infra Sections IV.B-C. 
 183. See supra Part I; S.B. 995, § 665(5), 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2016) 
(codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.665(5) (West 2016)). 
 184. See supra Section II.C. 
 185. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (defining 
criminal liability predicated upon agent action). 
 186. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 667 (1819). 
 187. See id. at 667-68. 
 188. See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.07 cmt. (AM. LAW INST. 1985); DRESSLER,
supra note 41, at 900. 
 189. DRESSLER, supra note 41, at 900 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 
cmt. (1985)). 
 190. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
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corporation may be held criminally liable if so dictated by statute, by 
omission of a legal obligation, or if the crime was authorized, 
solicited, or “recklessly tolerated by the board of directors.”191
Unsurprisingly, the structure of such liability reflects the cornerstone 
of corporate function: agency.192 An agency relationship forms where 
two parties agree that one party, as the agent, will act on behalf of 
another party, called the principal.193 The agent, acting within the 
appropriate scope of agency, remains subject to the principal’s 
direction and control.194 In the corporate setting, companies “have 
hundreds, sometimes thousands, of employees or agents.”195 Each of 
these agents, authorized to act on behalf of the corporation, subject 
the principal-corporation to criminal liability for any crimes 
perpetrated by the agent while acting within the scope of agency.196
Thus, to determine a corporation’s criminal liability for the crimes 
attributable to an AV, a court would have to determine the scope of 
the corporation’s involvement in the crime, including the role of its 
agents.197 Due to the inconsistent body of law governing such 
liability, however, the court’s task will prove difficult.198
B. No “Intelligible Body of Principle”: Corporate Criminal 
Jurisprudence
As the Model Penal Code notes, the case law surrounding 
corporate criminal liability lacks an “intelligible body of principle” 
by which it has developed.199 Generally, however, due to the difficult 
nature of holding corporations liable for the criminal offenses of 
their agents, it is much more common to hold agents responsible for 
 191. Id. at § 2.07(1)(a)-(c). 
 192. See LEE HARRIS, MASTERING CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ENTITIES 3 (2009) (“For instance, public corporations are legally recognized entities, 
but can do very little without the help of agents.”). 
 193. See id. at 5 (paraphrasing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01). 
 194. Id.
 195. Id. at 3. 
 196. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
 197. See State v. Christy Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 17, 19-20 (Minn. 
1984) (“Criminal liability, especially for more serious crimes, is thought of as a 
matter of personal, not vicarious, guilt. One should not be convicted for something 
one does not do. In what sense, then, does a corporation ‘do’ something for which it 
can be convicted of a crime?”).
 198. See DRESSLER, supra note 41, at 900. 
 199. See id.
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the acts of their principal corporations.200 Though cases of corporate 
criminal prosecutions are scant, the court in State v. Christy Pontiac-
GMC, Inc. held that corporations can be prosecuted and convicted 
for criminal offenses.201 In Christy, the sales manager at a car 
dealership engaged in rebate swindling after telling several 
customers that no rebate was available on the purchase of their new 
cars due to the expiration of the rebate period.202 The salesman then 
backdated the new-car purchase orders so that the sale date would be 
within the rebate period and submitted them to GM.203 Because the 
salesman forged the customers’ signatures and submitted the 
purchase orders with false rebate-eligible dates, he was able to 
embezzle the rebate money for himself without the customers’ 
knowledge.204
Relying on agency principles, the court established that a 
corporation may be found “guilty of a specific intent crime 
committed by its agent” if: (1) that agent committed the crime within 
his scope of employment; (2) the act was beneficial to the 
corporation’s business; and (3) corporate management expressly or 
implicitly authorized the action.205 Employees of Christy Pontiac, 
acting as agents of the car dealership, authorized and signed the 
faulty rebate forms. Because the agent-employees were acting in the 
scope of their employment, this fraudulent act opened the principal-
corporation to the same criminal liability206 as was applicable to the 
 200. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975) (citing State 
v. Burnam, 128 P. 218 (Wash. 1912); Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 75 P. 924 
(Colo. 1904)).  
 201. Christy, 354 N.W.2d. at 19. 
 202. Id. at 18. 
 203. Id.
 204. Id.
 205. Id. at 20. Specifically, the court established:  
Secondly, as to the kind of proof required, we hold that a corporation may 
be guilty of a specific intent crime committed by its agent if: (1) the agent 
was acting within the course and scope of his or her employment, having 
the authority to act for the corporation with respect to the particular 
corporate business which was conducted criminally; (2) the agent was 
acting, at least in part, in furtherance of the corporation’s business 
interests; and (3) the criminal acts were authorized, tolerated, or ratified by 
corporate management. 
Id.
 206. It is important to note that the court in Christy officially held only that 
corporations may be liable for “theft and forgery,” but the principles remain the 
same; if the agent performs illegal functions in his scope of employment, criminal 
liability may shift to the principal corporation. Id. at 19. 
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agents themselves.207 This liability, the court noted, rests upon the 
legislature’s intention “that corporations are to be considered 
persons” within the Minnesota criminal code.208 Accordingly, the 
court affirmed that the principal corporation, Christy Pontiac, was 
criminally liable for the acts of its salesman as agents of the 
corporation.209 Similarly, as part of their general criminal 
frameworks, both Michigan’s Penal Code and the Model Penal Code 
include “corporations” within their definition of “person.”210 Under 
the agency principles expressed in Christy211 and the Model Penal 
Code,212 then, if AVs were found to be legal persons, they could act 
as agents on behalf of their principal manufacturer-corporations. The 
key thus lies in the legal status of AVs—they are either legal persons 
or merely advanced machines.213
C. Whether AVs are Legal Persons 
Although corporate criminal liability certainly provides enough 
problems of its own,214 courts will also need to consider the legal 
status of AVs.215 Courts may be forced to determine whether an AV 
constitutes a “person” for the purpose of agent liability.216 According 
to the Restatement (Third) of Agency, a person includes a natural 
person, an organization with legal rights, or “any other entity that has 
legal capacity to possess rights and incur obligations.”217
Interestingly, the comments to this section of the Restatement spend 
several paragraphs refining “person.”218 For the purposes of liability, 
 207. Id. at 20-21. 
 208. Id. at 19. 
 209. Id. at 20-21. 
 210. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.10 (1931); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(8) 
(AM. LAW INST. 2015) (stating that “‘person,’ ‘he’ and ‘actor’ include any natural 
person and, where relevant, a corporation or an unincorporated association”). 
 211. Christy, 354 N.W.2d. at 20. 
 212. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
 213. See infra Section III.C. 
 214. See supra Section III.B. 
 215. See Duffy & Hopkins, supra note 12, at 454-55 (observing that “[a]s 
autonomous cars become increasingly prevalent, the risk and likelihood of collision 
with other vehicles rises.͒This poses a problem . . . because current state laws 
concerning automobile accident liability assume a human driver.” And, further, 
“existing laws do not directly address the determination of liability”). 
 216. See Christy, 354 N.W.2d at 20 (discussing a principle-corporation’s 
liability induced by its agent’s liability). 
 217. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04(5) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
 218. See id. at § 1.04 cmt. e. 
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it says, “it is not possible for an inanimate object or a nonhuman 
animal to be a principal or an agent.”219 Furthermore, “[a]t present,
computer programs are instrumentalities of the persons who use 
them. If a program malfunctions . . . the legal consequences for the 
person who uses it are no different than the consequences stemming 
from the malfunction of any other type of instrumentality.”220 AVs, 
though highly sophisticated, are, at their core, computer programs 
effectuating motion in mechanical structures.221 Applying the 
Restatement’s definition, the AV remains an inanimate object, not a 
principal or an agent;222 it is an instrumentality of the person who 
presses “go,” even though the complex computer program promises 
to act fully autonomously.223
That said, Michigan’s AV law directly contradicts this notion. 
S.B. 995 clearly says that the automated driving system is the driver 
or operator “for purposes of determining conformance to any 
applicable traffic or motor vehicle laws.”224 In that respect, the 
computer program is not the “instrumentality” of the agent at all. The 
program is the agent.225
Prior to this law, AVs currently did not have legal rights or 
obligations. According to the pre-amendment MVC, AVs may be 
operated on Michigan roads only if a human operator “is present in 
the vehicle while it is being operated” who can retake immediate 
control if necessary.226 This section carved out a narrow exception to 
Michigan’s ban on automated driving.227 The pre-amendment Code 
then held the human operator, and not the vehicle, liable for 
violations of the road-testing provision and any other section of the 
MVC.228 This, in large part, was due to the general restriction on 
operating the vehicle in “automatic mode”; if one could not drive in 
automatic mode without an approved test driver, then one likely 
could not claim that the car itself is legally liable for malfeasance.229
 219. Id.
 220. Id. (emphasis added). 
 221. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 2-3. 
 222. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 cmt. e. 
 223. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 2-3 (noting the varying levels of 
interaction between the human operator and the AV system).
 224. S.B. 955 § 665(5), 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2016) (codified at
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.665(5) (West 2016)). 
 225. See id. 
 226. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.665(2)(b) (2014). 
 227. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.663 (repealed 2016).  
 228. Id. § 257.666(1). 
 229. Id. §§ 257.663, 257.665. 
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But considering the new liability imposed on the automated 
driving system,230 it seems apparent that the AV now does have 
“legal capacity to possess rights and incur obligations.”231 S.B. 995 is 
clear; when in automated mode, the automated driving system is the 
operator.232 And, as if to reiterate the AVs agency, the law mandates 
that the automated driving system “shall be deemed to satisfy 
electronically all physical acts required by a driver or operator of the 
vehicle.”233 Thus, according to general agency principles outlined in 
the Restatement, one is hard-pressed to argue that the AV is not a 
legal person with “rights and obligations.”234
By making the automated driving system responsible, the new 
law seems to take AV manufacturers at their word—full automation 
takes the human out of the driver seat.235 And if the car promises to 
be responsible for the driving operation, then, put simply, it is. As 
AV technology continues to develop, it may be rightly said that the 
vehicle, and not the human operator, broke the law.236 So to answer 
with certainty the criminal-law questions posed by this promising 
technology, legislatures and courts should recognize a new solution: 
products culpability. 
IV. RIGHTING A WRONG: THE BEST SOLUTION TO CRIMINAL
LIABILITY FOR AVS
Though several scholars have discussed the criminal issues 
surrounding AVs,237 few, if any, have addressed the daily criminal 
 230. S.B. 995 § 665(5) (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.665(5)). 
 231. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04(5) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
 232. S.B. 995 § 665(5) (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.665(5)). 
 233. Id. (emphasis added). 
 234. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04(5) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
 235. WAYMO, https://waymo.com (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) (promising, 
“With fully self-driving technology, you’ll be able to get where you want to go at 
the push of a button—without the need for a person at the wheel”). 
 236. See Lauren Abdel-Razzaq, Self-Driving Car Technology Moves to 
Forefront at NAIAS, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 16, 2015, 2:22 PM), http:// 
www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/detroit-auto-show/2015/01/13/self-
driving-car-technology-naias/21731773/ [https://perma.cc/B5R4-Z94Z] (“[P]arts of 
the self-driving experience are on display now at Detroit’s Cobo Center: three-
dimensional cameras, lane-correction devices and other tools that increasingly 
remove the driver from the tasks of steering, braking and accelerating.”). 
 237. See generally Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 8 (discussing potential 
criminal liability related to AVs). 
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law issues that will arise with the advent of driverless vehicles.238 A 
minor malfunction in the radar may cause the car to pass a stop sign, 
run a red light, or exceed the speed limit.239 If and when this happens, 
consumers will lack a legal claim to sue under products liability, and 
manufacturers will be unable to predict their liability for the 
malfeasance.240 To remedy this gap in legal predictability, 
manufacturers should be held liable for AV-caused crimes where 
their products are shown to be culpable for certain criminal acts and 
harm caused thereby.241
A. A New Kind of Liability 
At a basic level, the law will have to deal with a new area of 
criminal violations that are wholly the fault of the AV.242 This new 
proposed category of actions against AV manufacturers may be most 
appropriately called products culpability. This new concept is 
necessary because no other technology promises to take over such a 
complicated process while allowing the human operator to 
completely rely on the technology to follow a comprehensive system 
of rules.243 With such complex technology, however, comes a 
complex solution.244 Detailed state vehicle codes govern everything 
from the amount of alcohol that a driver may consume to when the 
driver must stop at a yellow light.245 Replacing that driver—who 
operates in the complex framework of the vehicle code—with a 
computer makes the legal treatment of that new AV operator 
extremely difficult.246
 238. Note that AVs are driverless, not operator-less vehicles. That is, the 
most likely coming technology will allow the vehicle to operate autonomously with 
an operator still pressing “go.” A full chauffer system, which would allow operator-
less vehicles, is far in the future. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 2-3. 
 239. See Del-Colle, supra note 10 (acknowledging that the technology will 
never be flawless). 
 240. See supra Section II.C. 
 241. See infra Sections IV.B-C. 
 242. See Funkhouser, supra note 7, at 439 (noting the gap in legislation 
surrounding AVs). 
 243. See Del-Colle, supra note 10. 
 244. See Funkhouser, supra note 7, at 458 (observing the complexity of the 
technology). 
 245. See supra Part I. 
 246. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.13 (1949) (defining “driver” for purposes 
of the MVC as “every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a 
vehicle”). 
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For purposes of analogy, consider a common piece of 
technology: the smart phone. Nearly two-thirds of Americans own 
the technology.247 The technology could be used to make illegal 
prank calls, order illicit drugs, browse illegal websites, or download 
illegal content.248 To do any of those illegal acts, though, the operator 
of the technology must input certain parameters into the phone that 
will make the phone access illegal content or become an 
instrumentality in a criminal act.249 This is not the case for the AV.250
If the purchaser of the AV buys the product under the marketed 
promise that the technology will follow the traffic code,251 then it is 
reasonable to expect the AV to do exactly that. If the vehicle fails to 
avoid a stopped emergency vehicle and the human operator gets 
ticketed, then the operator has detrimentally relied on the failed 
technology.252 It is thus reasonable to hold the manufacturer, and not 
the reasonably inattentive human being, legally liable for breaking 
that law. In short, the culpability must rest with the person or thing 
inputting the illegal commands.253 In the case of the cell phone, the 
human who willfully downloads illegal content remains culpable.254
For the AV, however, the automated driving system that controls the 
gas pedal remains at fault for exceeding the speed limit.255 The law 
should recognize that the passive human operator–passenger has the 
legal right to require reimbursement from the culpable manufacturer 
for money damages he or she may suffer. 
 247. Jon Fingas, Two-Thirds of Americans Now Have Smartphones,
ENGADGET (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.engadget.com/2014/02/11/two-thirds-of-
americans-now-have-smartphones [https://perma.cc/38S9-WLNE]. 
 248. For example, see Robinson Meyer, Absurd: The Very Basic Thing It’s 
Still Illegal to Do With Your Mobile Phone, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 15, 2013), http:// 
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/11/absurd-the-very-basic-thing-its-
still-illegal-to-do-with-your-mobile-phone/281553 [https://perma.cc/5JCH-FAGU] 
(explaining how altering the firmware on a phone, or “unlocking” a phone, breaks 
federal copyright law). 
 249. See id. (noting that a smart phone operator may break the law simply by 
“chang[ing] the software on [one’s] phone”). 
 250. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 2-3. 
 251. See Chin, supra note 9 (describing the promise of AV technology). 
 252. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.653a (2001). 
 253. See Meyer, supra note 248 (assigning fault to the cell phone user). 
 254. Id.
 255. See WAYMO, supra note 5.  
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B. The Problem of Actus Reus
To remedy the complications inherent in assigning fault to 
either the human operator or the AV, one must return to the basic 
concepts of criminal law.256 To be guilty of any crime, the perpetrator 
must commit a voluntary act that causes a harm.257 This act, called 
the actus reus, is the first element to be satisfied in a criminal 
violation because the suspect must personally or proximately cause a 
harm through his or her own voluntary action.258 Without an illegal 
action, there would be no reason to hold the actor criminally liable 
for the harm.259 Importantly, in the case of AVs, the human operator–
passenger likely does no voluntary act that would satisfy the actus 
reus element.260 This problem arises because the human operator of 
the vehicle is not acting at all when operating a fully autonomous 
vehicle.261 Though the human operator may push the “go” button or 
input the destination into a navigation device, the human operator is 
in no way causing—or acting in the commission of—the violation of 
the code.262 Just as a human passenger in a standard vehicle fully 
relinquishes control to the human driver, so too does the human 
operator in an AV fully relinquish control to the automated driving 
system after inputting a destination.263
Similarly, neither the AV nor the human programmer of the 
autonomous software acts to commit the crime.264 The AV 
manufacturer is no more engaging in the actus reus of running a stop 
sign than is the manufacturer of a gun engaging in the actus reus of 
shooting an innocent victim. Unfortunately, few useful analogies to 
AVs exist. At least for now, guns cannot be programmed to 
autonomously shoot an innocent victim.265 In the age of AV 
technology, however, the manufacturer does intentionally remove the 
 256. See DRESSLER, supra note 41, at 5 n.5 (examining the purposes of 
criminal law, stating “the judiciary . . . ensure[s] that the rights of the minority are 
respected” through the criminal process). 
 257. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
 258. DRESSLER, supra note 41, at 127. 
 259. Id. (describing the purposes for requiring actus reus).
 260. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. 
 261. See Del-Colle, supra note 10. 
 262. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 263. See infra text accompanying note 299; Chin, supra note 9. 
 264. See Del-Colle, supra note 10 (describing the driver relinquishing 
control and the AV maneuvering via advanced integrated technologies). 
 265. Or presumably, if they could be so programmed, there would be a user 
internationally inputting the “shoot” command into the gun. 
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human operator from controlling the vehicle, which effectively 
nullifies the operator’s actus reus. The AV promises to take over the 
previously human-held driving responsibilities.266
In many ways, exceeding the speed limit in an AV is similar to 
a third party physically grabbing the arm of an innocent person and 
forcing him to batter someone else. There is simply no voluntary act 
when someone else makes the would-be defendant do a bad act, and 
there is no human voluntary act when an automated driving system 
causes the AV to exceed the speed limit.267 It is the AV that does this 
in lieu of the human operator. Without this voluntary act, the human 
operator does not satisfy the actus reus element of the crime because 
the human operator is not acting at all.268 The criminal law should 
thus not hold that human responsible.269 Instead, the law should hold 
the AV and its manufacturer criminally culpable through the 
products culpability cause of action. The harm still occurs, and the 
criminal law must deter and punish harmful, illegal behavior.270
C. A Harm Without an Actor 
Problematically, even without a clearly defined human actor, 
the harm inherent in violating the vehicle code still occurs. Vehicle 
codes have recognized that a harm results when a driver passes 
through a red light,271 and that harm occurs whether the human 
operator personally acts in the commission of the act or not. That is, 
regardless of the agent responsible for crossing illegally into the 
intersection, there is still a good chance that the car will collide with 
a vehicle rightfully passing through the adjacent green light. By 
choosing to operate any vehicle, a human operator must 
acknowledge the possibility of harm arising from its operation; 
vehicle collisions are simply a reality of using automobiles.272 That 
is, even if the AV technology is “driving,” the human must know 
 266. See Del-Colle, supra note 10 (describing the human driver relinquishing 
control to the AV); supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 268. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 3 (indicating that full Level 4 
automation leaves the driver with few responsibilities). 
 269. See DRESSLER, supra note 41, at 127. 
 270. Id. at 32-33 (describing the theories of punishment as a deterrent for 
future harm). 
 271. MICH. COMP. LAWS 257.612(1)(c)(i) (2014). 
 272. See INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, General Statistics,
http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/general-statistics/fatalityfacts/state-by-state-
overview (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).  
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that running a red light would still cause a harm that needs to be 
deterred.273 Yet, with the promise of AV technology, humans should 
justifiably rely on the AV to drive for them—to keep them 
reasonably safe so long as the human operator is working within the 
parameters set by the manufacturer. 
To solve this apparent incongruity in the law, the state 
legislatures should adopt the concept of products culpability. Similar 
to products liability, this concept is rooted in negligence274 and will 
rely on the relationship between the manufacturer and the human 
operator of the AV. It holds the manufacturer liable for a breach of 
duty owed to the human operator that results in a harm.275 This 
concept should be divided into three tiers: civil infractions, strict-
liability infractions, and intent-based infractions. 
1. Civil Infractions: Lacking the Criminal Element 
For civil infractions, the manufacturers of AVs should make 
clear to the individual consumer in the purchasing contract for the 
AV that any fees incurred by the human operator due to civil 
infractions caused by the AV will remain the sole responsibility of 
the human operator. Otherwise, the numerous civil infractions 
incurred by owners of AVs would become an inefficient and 
unmanageable source of litigation for manufacturers.276 Prohibited 
conduct leading to civil infractions ranges from failing to remove a 
vehicle from the scene of an accident to failing to stop at a flashing 
red light.277
With such widely varying examples of civil infractions, both 
AV manufacturers and consumers would be best served through a 
 273. See DRESSLER, supra note 41, at 35 (discussing the purpose of 
punishment as a deterrent). 
 274. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 275. Parrot v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 524, 537 (1872) 
(noting that “[a] party charging negligence as a ground of action must prove it. He 
must show that the defendant, by his act or by his omission, has violated some duty 
incumbent upon him, which has caused the injury complained of”). 
 276. Civil infractions govern a wide range of prohibited conduct, including 
“disobey[ing] the instructions of a traffic control device”; failing to stop at a flashing 
red signal; and failing to move a vehicle from the scene of an accident. MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 257.611(1), 257.614(1), 257.618a (2016). If AV use becomes widespread, 
the claims against manufacturers for civil infractions would become unmanageable. 
See Chin, supra note 9 (predicting the systematic implementation of AV 
technology). 
 277. See supra note 276.  
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contractual assumption of such penalties at the time of purchase to 
avoid unnecessary contention over penalties in the future.278 Because, 
as a matter of law, civil infractions are not considered criminal in 
nature,279 the culpability for such action need not pass to the AV 
manufacturer. Whereas a criminal statute imposes moral fault on the 
actor for the harm caused, civil infractions merely intend to deter 
minor violations of traffic policies.280 Furthermore, as a matter of 
public policy, there are simply too many civil infractions to pass 
criminal culpability to the manufacturer for each infraction, even 
though the owner may suffer financial harm. Of course, if the AV 
running the red light were to cause an accident or further injury, then 
the manufacturer may be liable for that harm under products 
liability.281 For the actual civil infraction, though, the law should hold 
the human operator liable as a matter of strict, contractually defined 
liability.282
2. Strict-Liability Criminal Infractions 
For strict-liability criminal infractions, the law should 
recognize a cause of action for products culpability. Examples of 
strict-liability infractions include moving violations that cause injury 
or death to another and failing to properly avoid a stopped 
 278. The Restatement of Torts says: 
When permitted by contract law, substantive law governing the claim, and 
applicable rules of construction, a contract between the plaintiff and 
another person absolving the person from liability for future harm bars the 
plaintiff’s recovery from that person for the harm. Unlike a plaintiff’s 
negligence, a valid contractual limitation on liability does not provide an 
occasion for the fact finder to assign a percentage of responsibility to any 
party or other person. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 (AM. LAW INST.
2000) (emphasis added). Several such contractual provisions will be necessary to 
ensure a proper legal relationship between AV manufacturers and consumers. 
 279. This is true in Michigan, at least. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.907(1) 
(2015).
 280. See DRESSLER, supra note 41, at 32-33, 35 (discussing the purpose of 
punishment as a deterrent); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.6a (2016) (stating that civil 
infractions do not amount to a crime). 
 281. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (AM.
LAW INST. 1998). 
 282. Again, this conclusion stems simply from public policy and the general 
principles of criminal law noted in this section. See DRESSLER, supra note 41, at 35 
(discussing the purpose of punishment as a deterrent; deterring civil infractions are 
not included in those purposes). 
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emergency vehicle.283 The problem with holding the human operator 
responsible for strict-liability criminal offenses lies in the actus
reus.284 The human operator of an AV has not, in fact, done anything 
voluntarily to injure another person. With the promise of AV 
technology, a human operator should reasonably believe that the 
software and hardware in the vehicle has full, effective control.285
The recent change in the MVC supports this conclusion 
because it makes the automated driver system the “driver or 
operator.”286 In other words, it places the responsibility on the car,
instead of on the human inside the car. Although the law requires a 
human in the testing phase,287 fully autonomous vehicles may be 
operated on Michigan roads with the system fully in control.288 It 
follows, then, that the AV would be responsible for the violation of 
any strict-liability laws. That is, laws that require an actus reus but
no mens rea. Further, the new law deems the automated driving 
system the actor—the one capable of committing the actus reus—
which sets up a system of criminal liability imposed on the 
manufacturer of the AV. As noted supra Part III, the AV would be 
the agent of the manufacturer. Because the strict-liability laws in the 
MVC make the actor liable, the principal of the agent, i.e., the 
manufacturer of the AV, would be liable for the violation. This 
synthesis of agency principles follows directly from the Michigan 
legislature’s insistence that the actual system is the driver of a fully 
autonomous vehicle.289 And the need for an action in products 
culpability becomes clear. 
So, to make AVs a clearly defined part of the market, further 
legislation is necessary.290 Because the harm still occurs at the time of 
 283. Supra Section I.B. 
 284. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text. 
 285. See Verne Kopytoff, Will We Need a Learner’s Permit for Self-Driving 
Cars?, FORTUNE (Oct. 30, 2014, 7:10 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/10/30/learners-
permit-for-self-driving-cars/ [https://perma.cc/2SFH-SU2H] (noting that drivers will 
be encouraged to “[s]it back, relax, and let software and sensors handle the job”). 
 286. See S.B. 995 § 665(5), 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2016) (codified at
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.665(5) (West 2016)). But see NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 482A.070 (2013) (mandating that: “If an autonomous vehicle is being tested on a 
highway within this State, a human operator must be . . . [c]apable of taking over 
immediate manual control of the autonomous vehicle in the event of a failure of the 
autonomous technology or other emergency”).  
 287. S.B. 995 § 665(2) (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.665(2)).  
 288. Id. § 665(4). 
 289. See id. § 665(5). 
 290. See Funkhouser, supra note 7, at 439 (noting the gap in legislation 
surrounding AVs). 
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the violation, the culpability and liability must be clear before AVs 
become a significant part of the automobile market. Otherwise, both 
manufacturers and consumers will be faced with the possibility of 
expensive litigation to determine who or what is actually liable for 
speeding past a stopped emergency vehicle.291
Again, if the AV is fully controlling the vehicle, then the law 
simply should not hold that a human passenger satisfies the actus
reus of the crime. The human has not acted voluntarily at all.292 In 
essence, the technology promises to make the human operator as 
much at fault in an AV as the back-seat passenger is in the standard 
automobile.293 In the standard vehicle, the passengers are not held 
liable for the acts of the driver, whether that act constitutes failing to 
obey a police officer,294 driving drunk,295 or driving a vehicle unfit for 
road use.296 It is solely the driver’s responsibility to ensure the safe 
operation of his vehicle.297 According to a straight reading of the 
amended MVC, that “driver” is now the AV.298 So, just as the 
passenger in a standard vehicle is not liable for the fault of the 
standard driver due to his absence of actus reus, so too should the 
human operator of the AV pass culpability to the manufacturer of the 
AV.299
So what should the new legislation be? Updated legislation 
should hold the manufacturer culpable, and thus financially liable, 
upon a finding that a failure in hardware or software caused the 
infraction.300 For example, if the radar atop the AV failed to see a red 
light and thus failed to stop, the law should hold the manufacturer or 
installer of the radar liable. The only element acting in that situation 
was the radar, and the efficacy of the radar is the responsibility of the 
manufacturer, just as it would be in a products liability action.301
Importantly, if the human operator tampers with the equipment, then 
the AV manufacturer would not be liable. But where the human 
 291. See supra Section I.B. 
 292. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
 293. A passenger may well be liable for violating other laws, such as failing 
to wear a seatbelt. See MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 257.710e(3), (8) (2016). 
 294. Id. § 257.602a(1). 
 295. Id. § 257.625(2)(a)-(b). 
 296. Id. § 257.683(1). 
 297. See id.
 298. S.B. 995 § 665(5), 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2016) (codified at
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.665(5) (West 2016)). 
 299. See supra text accompanying note 293. 
 300. See supra Section IV.A. 
 301. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998). 
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operator of the AV has not acted, and thus has not satisfied the 
requisite element of the criminal offense, the justice system should 
not punish him. Doing so would violate the very purpose of the 
justice system: to punish the malfeasant.302 By punishing the wrong 
actor, the system abates no harm and arbitrarily punishes innocent 
people.303 Instead, the legislature and courts must recognize the 
importance of placing liability with the guilty party and should allow 
for a cause of action against the AV manufacturer.304 This maintains 
the purposes of punishment under the general purpose of the criminal 
law: deterrence of the harm caused by illegal acts.305
3. Intent-Based Crimes: Adding Mens Rea
Though intent-based mens rea crimes are often more difficult 
to prove, the criminal law for specific-intent crimes is surprisingly 
well-tailored to a world of AVs.306 Examples of mens rea crimes 
include willfully disobeying a traffic signal by a police officer and 
knowingly operating an unsafe vehicle.307 Intent-based crimes do not 
require much legislative change because, generally speaking, neither 
the human operator nor the automated driving system of the AV will 
satisfy the mens rea element of the relevant statute.308 If the 
automated driving system is in full control of the vehicle and the 
vehicle ignores a police officer, then the human operator is simply 
not guilty; the operator did not willfully ignore the police officer.309
Even in a standard automobile, the driver would not be found liable 
without the requisite intent.310 In the above example, if the driver 
never saw the police officer, then charging him with “willfully 
 302. As the Model Penal Code states, one of its purposes is “to subject to 
public control persons whose conduct indicates that they are disposed to commit 
crimes.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
 303. Id.
 304. See DRESSLER, supra note 41, at 32-33 (discussing the purpose of 
punishment as a deterrent). 
 305. Id. 
 306. This is because the intent element of the crime is likely missing. See
infra note 312 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra Section I.C. 
 308. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.602a(1) (2016) (requiring that the 
operator of a motor vehicle not “willfully” disregard and officer’s directions).
 309. See id.
 310. See id.
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ignoring” the officer would fail. The driver would lack the mens rea
element for the offense.311
Similarly, when the human operator fully relinquishes control 
to the AV, the willful element will be impossible to prove.312 If the 
technology works as promised, then the human operator will in fact 
do little or nothing “willfully” during the operation of the vehicle.313
The person seated in the front position may press “go,” and the 
automated, programmed system of the AV will take over all willful 
operations—if a computer can operate “willfully” at all.314 But none 
of those things constitute a willful disobedience of the law. Thus, 
neither the human operator nor the AV satisfies the elements of the 
crime because he, she, or it will not have committed an act that meets 
the requisite mens rea standard of willfulness.315
On the other hand,316 one might argue that, according to the 
promise of the technology, the human operator certainly intended to 
start the vehicle in motion by entering a final destination.317 In the 
example of disobeying the signal of the police officer, however, that 
intent does not satisfy the element of mens rea. The intent to move a 
vehicle is not the intent required. The driver must intend, as a willful 
act, to disobey the command of an officer.318 One may intend to drive 
or operate the AV, but have no intent or mens rea whatsoever 
regarding the command of the officer. If the human operator 
maintains only intent to move the vehicle without the willful 
disobedience of the officer, then the statutory elements of the statute 
 311. The Model Penal Code defines “purposely,” which is akin to 
“willfully,” as the perpetrator’s “conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature 
or to cause such a result,” with the attendant circumstance satisfied. MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.02(2)(a). 
 312. There is no willful or purposeful act on the part of the operator. Id.
 313. See WAYMO, supra note 5. 
 314. Id.; S.B. 995 § 665(5), 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2016) (codified at
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.665(5) (West 2016)).
 315. See supra note 311 and accompanying text. 
 316. There are very few published counterarguments to this theory, as there 
are few published articles on AVs in general. The arguments provided are ones that 
are reasonably predictable, given the subject matter. 
 317. See WAYMO, supra note 5 (explaining the Google self-driving car). 
 318. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (noting that a perpetrator must act 
with the requisite mens rea “with respect to each material element of the offense”) 
(emphasis added). The intent to move the vehicle does not satisfy the material 
element required in the example, i.e., disobeying the officer. 
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are not satisfied, and the human operator may not be charged with 
the crime.319
Similarly, the AV software does not willfully disobey the 
police officer because the software simply responds according to its 
programming.320 It is problematic, both practically and 
philosophically, to say that the machine has a will in the same way 
that a human does.321 As always, the manufacturer could be held 
liable for programming the intentional breaking of a traffic law, but 
that kind of technological crime should be treated similarly to any 
other technology-based crime.322 Otherwise, while the AV controls 
the vehicle, it is likely that the human operator has no intent 
regarding the movement of the vehicle, except that the vehicle 
arrives at the destination safely.323 Likewise, the AV does not have an 
intent beyond its programming.324 Assuming no intentional 
malfeasance in the programming, then, the mens rea element of the 
crime will nearly always be missing, resulting in no sustainable 
criminal charges.325
4. Negligence, Accident, Intent: When an AV Kills 
As noted above, an AV is not likely to “intentionally” disobey 
a traffic law. But could an AV intentionally kill someone? Well, that 
is conceivable, but it would require programming by a human being 
who intends that result. The consequences of such a nefarious plan 
are best left to another Article—or perhaps the next Terminator
movie. Absent a plan to target pedestrians, the same analysis above 
applies; the AV acts according to its programming, and it therefore 
would not have the intent to disobey traffic laws. Again, if it does so 
inadvertently, both the human operator and the AV still lack the 
requisite mens rea to be found guilty of a specific-intent crime. 
On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that an AV would 
negligently cause the death of a human being. For a showing of 
 319. See Mich. COMP. LAWS § 257.602a(1) (2016) (requiring that the 
operator of a motor vehicle not “willfully” disregard the officer’s directions). 
 320. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at xix-xxi (explaining the 
technology behind AVs). 
 321. The court could not hold the car liable for the same reasons that the 
court cannot hold a computer liable for defrauding software manufacturers. See THE
SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 176. 
 322. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 323. See Chin, supra note 9 (explaining the promise of AV technology). 
 324. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at xix-xxi. 
 325. See supra note 311 and accompanying text. 
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negligent homicide, the MPC requires only that the actor cause the 
death of a human being by grossly deviating from the standard of a 
reasonable person.326 And, again using Michigan as an example, both 
Michigan courts and the MVC impose penalties for negligent 
homicide.327 In fact, to sustain a charge of negligent homicide in 
Michigan—or “involuntary manslaughter,” as it is known there—the 
prosecutor need only show either an unlawful act or a negligent act 
or omission that results in the death of another.328
Unfortunately, negligent acts and omissions occur all too often 
in vehicles. For example, if a driver fails to exercise reasonable care 
when approaching a crosswalk, it is entirely possible that his or her 
negligence would result in the death of a pedestrian.329 Depending on 
the specific facts, the law could hold the driver responsible for 
negligent homicide.330 In Michigan, that means up to fifteen years in 
prison and up to a $7,500 fine.331
But what if the AV is driving? As discussed throughout this 
Article, the very promise of AVs is that the driver is no longer in 
control. Imagine pushing “go” on an AV and opening a favorite 
book, looking up from the page only to see the AV make contact 
with a pedestrian. What then? Res ipsa loquitor? The accident itself 
means that someone was negligent?  
The solution to this complex issue must lie in the relationship 
between the technology and its user, along with who—or what—was 
actually negligent. First, courts must examine the relationship 
formed between the consumer and the manufacturer as defined by 
relevant contracts, promises, marketing, and reasonable expectations. 
In the Waymo vehicle, for example, there is no steering wheel.332 It 
would therefore be illogical for Google to claim that the human 
operator had the responsibility to swerve before hitting the 
pedestrian; there is no mechanism by which to implement such an 
avoidance tactic.
 326. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d). 
 327. See supra Section I.D. 
 328. People v. Richardson, 293 N.W.2d 332, 336 (Mich. 1980), modified on 
other grounds, People v. Beach, 418 N.W.2d 861, 870 n.9 (Mich. 1988). 
 329. See Injury Prevention & Control: Motor Vehicle Safety, CDC, 
https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/pedestrian_safety [https://perma.cc/4ZHE-
KD27] (last visited February 6, 2017) (noting that 4,735 pedestrians were killed in 
traffic crashes in the United States in 2013).  
 330. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.321. 
 331. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.321. 
 332. See supra note 5. 
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Still, the second important consideration is who or what was 
actually negligent. The promise of automation should not make the 
AV negligent as a matter of law. Courts will need to recognize and 
develop new standards of care for AV technology, just as they have 
done for other unforeseen groups, like pilots.333 As with most 
liability-based issues, the facts will vary widely in each case. For 
example, imagine an examination of the AV’s programming reveals 
that the manufacturer rushed to release the AV and failed to 
appropriately test pedestrian-avoidance features. Notwithstanding all 
of the hardware and software in the vehicle, the system was simply 
ill-equipped to recognize a person walking across the street. Of 
course, this is highly unlikely given the obviousness of the danger. 
But such a situation surely amounts to negligence if the 
programming failed to reasonably account for pedestrians.  
In such a situation, it would violate the very purpose of the 
criminal law to hold the human operator responsible. Again, besides 
pushing “go,” the human operator has done nothing negligent in the 
commission of the homicide. In fact, based on the promise of the 
technology, it is perfectly reasonable for the driver to be distracted 
while in the fully autonomous car. After all, that is the point of the 
technology. Accordingly, the $7,500 fine should pass to the 
manufacturer through products culpability. The importance of that 
concept lies not in holding the AV liable for damages suffered by the 
human operator,334 but in bypassing the human operator altogether 
when assessing criminal liability. In other words, the criminal statute 
that makes the human operator culpable simply would not apply; the 
human satisfies neither the actus reus nor the mens rea of the crime. 
Moreover, the AV itself is acting as the agent of the manufacturer, as 
described further below.335
That said, if the vehicle is not yet fully autonomous, then the 
driver should not rely on the vehicle to take full control.336 For 
example, Tesla has an autopilot mode, but it requires drivers to take 
control whenever necessary.337 Failing to take control before a 
 333. See Turner v. United States, 736 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1000 (M.D.N.C. 
2010).
 334. This issue is best dealt with under the product liability umbrella.  
 335. See infra Subsection IV.D.3. 
 336. See supra note 13. 
 337. See Rachel Abrams and Annalyn Kurtz, Joshua Brown, Who Died in 
Self-Driving Accident, Tested Limits of His Tesla N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/business/joshua-brown-technology-
enthusiast-tested-the-limits-of-his-tesla.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/86FE-6QQL]. 
 Criminal Liability & Autonomous Vehicles 139 
collision has already led to one fatality.338 If the manufacturer makes 
it clear that the vehicle is not fully self-driving, then the human 
operator would continue to be responsible under the traditional 
framework provided by state vehicle codes. 
Finally, but importantly, this Article is not advocating for a sort 
of “fairness” standard. Products culpability is not premised on the 
argument that “well, someone must pay, so it should be the big 
companies.” In fact, that would violate the underlying principles of 
criminal law just as much as holding the innocent human operator 
responsible. Products culpability suggests holding the manufacturer 
liable for negligence only where the manufacturer actually breached 
its duty of care. To show negligent homicide, for example, the State 
still bears the burden of showing that the manufacturer was, in fact, 
negligent. This may be through an examination of the programming, 
hardware, or a foreseeable malfunction. But the burden of proof 
remains with the State, and, as in any criminal case, all parties are 
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.339
Even in light of this solution, amendments to current criminal 
laws are necessary. A prosecutor cannot charge a vehicle with 
manslaughter, and a court cannot sentence a car to fifteen years in 
prison. Yet, fatal accidents that meet the common-law requirements 
of manslaughter will still occur.340 So in this autonomous age, it will 
be up to legislatures to decide how to hold machines criminally liable 
in light of practical restrictions on sentencing. And, as always, it will 
be up to the courts to interpret those newly minted laws. 
D. What Would the Courts Say?: Analyzing Case Law
Although courts have analyzed GPS technology,341 autopilot 
programming,342 and corporate criminal liability,343 none of those 
 338. Id. 
 339. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978) (“The principle that 
there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, 
axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the 
administration of our criminal law.” (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 
453 (1895))). 
 340. See People v. Richardson, 293 N.W.2d 332, 336 (Mich. 1980) (noting 
that manslaughter requires a showing of a negligent act or omission), modified on 
other grounds, People v. Beach, 418 N.W.2d 861, 870 n.9 (Mich. 1988). 
 341. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Harwood, No. 100916536, slip op. at 1 (Utah 3d. 
Jud. Dist. Ct. May 27, 2011). 
 342. See, e.g., Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 544 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2011). 
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cases provide adequate corollaries to AVs. The very promise of the 
technology makes a decision for or against liability unprecedented, 
and the courts will be faced with the task of analogizing or 
distinguishing prior case law.344 The general principles do illuminate 
the way that courts analyze products liability and technology 
issues,345 however, and the cases deserve examination. 
1. Distinguishing Rosenberg
The case of Rosenberg v. Harwood provides contrast for the 
truly unique nature of AVs.346 Whereas in Rosenberg the court said 
that Google did not “deprive[] the plaintiff of his normal 
opportunities for protection,”347 the promise of AVs is to do just 
that.348 Unlike GPS technology, which simply adds navigation 
abilities to the user’s life,349 AVs are meant to assume the normal 
duty of care that drivers maintain every day.350 Unlike in Rosenberg,
where there was no “contractual or fiduciary relationship” that would 
give rise to Google’s duty, such a fiduciary duty is the exact promise 
that makes AV technology so appealing.351 AV technology promises 
that drivers will be able to relax on the way to work while reading a 
book, watching a movie, or enjoying coffee, all while their AVs 
avoid obstacles, follow the speed limit and other laws, and maintain 
safety for the human operator and passengers.352 By making such 
 343. See State v. Christy Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. 
1984).
 344. See supra Section II.B. 
 345. See generally Rosenberg, No. 100916536, slip op. at 1; Glorvigen, 796 
N.W.2d at 548. 
 346. Even the unique facts in Rosenberg fall short of the problems created by 
AVs. See Rosenberg, No. 100916536, slip op. at 2-4 (describing the technological 
elements of GPS). 
 347. Id. at 3 n.5 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) (AM.
LAW INST. 1965)). 
 348. See generally Chin, supra note 9. 
 349. See Marshall Brain & Tom Harris, How GPS Receivers Work,
HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/travel/gps.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/L8C6-C8FN] (last visited Dec. 27, 2016). 
 350. See generally Chris Urmson, The View from the Front Seat of the 
Google Self-Driving Car, Backchannel (May 11, 2015), https://backchannel.com/the-
view-from-the-front-seat-of-the-google-self-driving-car-46fc9f3e6088#.gz59efm3p 
[https://perma.cc/DQK7-9XWE]. 
 351. Rosenberg, No. 100916536, slip op. at 3. 
 352. See Del-Colle, supra note 10 (describing riding in an AV and 
automatically following the traffic laws). 
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representations, AV manufacturers are guaranteeing to perform for 
AV owners the basic safety and legal functions that drivers guarantee 
for themselves every day.353 In so guaranteeing, manufacturers are 
creating a nearly fiduciary relationship with the driver that far 
exceeds the relationship that humans have with other products; much 
like a doctor or a lawyer, the AV promises to keep the human 
operator safe and to follow the law while doing so.354
In creating this nearly fiduciary duty, then, manufacturers of 
AV technology are liable for the civil and criminal harm that arises 
from the use of their products. No other technology purports to 
follow the law as the principal actor in the same way that the AV 
does. In fact, even when a product, such as the radar scanner, 
promises to enable the driver to follow the law in a vaguely similar 
way, that product offers to pay the criminal fines imposed due to the 
failure of the product.355 The case of the AV thus forms the precise 
case that satisfies the elements missing in the Rosenberg case: the 
AV removes from the driver the duty of self-protection, promises a 
fiduciary or caretaker role, and promises to keep the driver safe. 
Unlike the GPS technology in Rosenberg, which the court found 
owed none of those caretaker duties,356 the AV manufacturers 
explicitly promise this kind of safety and voluntarily undertake a 
nearly fiduciary role.357 With such a broad undertaking of safety for 
the driver, the duty of care denied to the plaintiff in Rosenberg surely 
applies to manufactures of AVs through their marketed promises.358
The unique technology requires the new, unique products culpability 
cause of action.359
2. Cars on Autopilot: Analogizing Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design 
Corporation
Though the Glorvigen case deals with products liability, it 
provides a valuable standard by which courts evaluate the duty of 
 353. Id.
 354. Id. (describing the ability of AVs to take control of driving). 
 355. See K40 ELECTRONICS, supra note 179. 
 356. Rosenberg, No. 100916536, slip op. at 3. 
 357. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 3 (describing the fullest level of 
automation). 
 358. With such an advanced level of automation, the driver gives full control 
to the AV, thus trusting it for safety and to effectively abide by the law. See id.
 359. See supra Section IV.A. 
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manufacturers to purchasers of automated equipment.360 The court 
extended the standard provided by the Restatement (Second) to hold 
a manufacturer liable if the manufacturer: (1) knows that the 
supplied-for use is dangerous; (2) reasonably thinks that the user will 
not realize its dangerous potential; and (3) does not exercise 
reasonable care to warn the user.361 Though the danger inherent in 
autopilot technology differs from AV technology,362 AVs maintain 
their own danger—they may break the law without warning.363
Presumably, though, the promise of AV technology, indeed the very 
crux of the marketing, lies in a safer experience.364 So, if Google or 
Audi knows that the car may break the law through malfunction, yet 
fails to warn the consumer, then the court should hold the 
manufacturer to the same standard that applies in products liability 
actions.365 Though typical products liability issues certainly exist for 
AVs,366 the more complicated problem surrounds monetary damages, 
or damages arising from civil and criminal liability under the 
relevant vehicle code.367 As opposed to Glorvigen, where the court 
found no duty to train consumers, courts should recognize a basic 
duty for car manufacturers to either accept liability for intent-based 
and strict-liability crimes or to lose the option to advertise vehicles 
that “drive themselves.”368 With the manufacturer’s sales-pitch 
promise of safety and better driving must come liability for a failure 
to keep that promise; thus, the court should adopt the doctrine of 
products culpability against vehicles promising safe automation.369
3. The Corporate Agency Doctrine Remains Relevant 
Even if the courts choose to adopt the products culpability 
doctrine, they may still seek to apply some of the agency doctrine 
 360. See Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 550 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2011). 
 361. Id.
 362. The inherent danger with autopilot technology lies in flying; AVs will 
not (for now) leave the ground. 
 363. See Del-Colle, supra note 10 (acknowledging that the technology will 
never be flawless). 
 364. See Muller, supra note 127. 
 365. See supra notes 158 and 361 and accompanying text.
 366. See Funkhouser, supra note 7, at 452-58. 
 367. See supra Part I. 
 368. See WAYMO, supra note 5 (advertising the “self-driving car”). 
 369. See supra Section IV.A. 
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usually associated with corporate criminal liability.370 In the Christy
case, the court found that a corporation could be found criminally 
liable for the acts of its agents because of its status as a legal 
person.371 Though the court there was interested only in theft and 
fraud,372 the general rules should be applied to corporate technology 
giants as well.373 The court did not focus on the nature of the 
corporation or the nature of the fraud, but rather on the nature of the 
relationship between the criminally liable agent and the 
corporation.374 That is, if the agent acts in such a way that he or she 
acts in place of the corporation, then that criminal liability is imputed 
to the corporation.375 Of course, there will likely be no Google, Tesla, 
or BMW employee sitting in the passenger seat of a consumer AV.376
Could the car itself be the agent of the manufacturer 
corporation, though?377 If the promise of AV technology relies upon 
full control of the vehicle by the vehicle itself, then perhaps Google 
would be promising that the car, as an agent of the corporation, 
remains fully in charge of the driving experience.378 Though the 
Restatement of Agency notes that computers are simply 
instrumentalities of corporations or other entities, it limits the point 
by saying that “[a]t present,” computers are not agents.379 But under 
the driver-less system promised by Google,380 the car seems to be 
exactly that. And under Michigan’s new law, it is even clearer. The 
automated driving system is the driver or operator.381 That fact alone 
makes the agency theory a solid foundation on which to build a case 
of products culpability. If the automated driving system is the driver 
of the AV, and the system was designed and implemented by the 
manufacturer corporation, then the system is driving as an agent of 
the manufacturer corporation. 
 370. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 371. State v. Christy Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. 1984). 
 372. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 373. See About Google, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/about
[https://perma.cc/R2BJ-8J8B] (last visited Dec. 27, 2016). 
 374. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 375. See id.
 376. See Franzen, supra note 123. 
 377. See supra Part III.B-C. 
 378. See WAYMO, supra note 5. 
 379. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.
2006).
 380. See WAYMO, supra note 5. 
 381. S.B. 995 § 665(5), 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2016) (codified at
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.665(5) (West 2016)). 
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Put another way, imagine visiting the Google headquarters for 
an important meeting. An employee standing near the door offers to 
valet-park visitors’ vehicles. According to the Restatement, that 
employee falls directly within the definition of “agent” for Google.382
The employee-valet is an individual acting on behalf of a principal 
corporation, Google, Inc., who may incur legal rights and obligations 
on behalf of the company.383 The legal right is to act on behalf of 
Google to park visitors’ cars, and the obligation is to park them 
safely and effectively.  
If the agent were to wreck the vehicle, go joyriding on the 
highway, or incur any other moving infraction, the liability would 
certainly rest with the driver and, according to the principles of 
Christy,384 with Google as the principal.385 That same agent 
responsibility, it seems, forms the promise of AV technology.386 Cars 
can already park themselves,387 and fully automated AVs would be 
able to drop off the human operator–passenger at the door, park 
itself, and then pick up the human operator–passenger on 
command.388 This virtual valet maintains nearly the exact same 
relationships between the manufacturer, the AV, and the human 
operator–passenger as the human valet at the door of Google’s 
headquarters.389 In a standard automobile, the driver hands the valet 
his keys; in an AV, the human operator presses “go” on the AVs 
control panel. The valet then parks the car; or, the software engages 
and parks the car instead.  
There is no appreciable difference between AV technology and 
classic agency. Though the software does not form a natural person, 
 382. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 1.01, 1.04(5). 
 383. See id. §§ 1.01, 1.04(5). 
 384. It is again worth noting that Christy established a limited decision,
applicable only to Minnesota. See State v. Christy Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 
17, 17, 19 (Minn. 1984). The principles, however, are consistent: agents may impute 
criminal liability to their principal corporations. This is the concept of respondeat 
superior applied in another, logical context. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 2.04. 
 385. Id. §§ 1.01, 1.04, 2.04 (establishing the agency relationship and tort 
liability). 
 386. See Del-Colle, supra note 10 (describing riding in an AV and 
automatically following the traffic laws). 
 387. See, e.g., Active Park Assist, FORD, http://owner.ford.com/how-tos/ 
vehicle-features/convenience-and-comfort/active-park-assist.html [https://perma.cc/ 
2SL7-T89B] (last visited Dec. 27, 2016).
 388. See Chin, supra note 9 (describing the potential of AV technology). 
 389. See id.
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neither does the corporation.390 Where the company essentially 
promises to replace the driver with a fully automated system, it ought 
to be held to an agency culpability standard—a standard that would 
be best implemented by instituting the products culpability cause of 
action.391
E. AVs as Chattel  
While many commentators recognize the complexities of such 
agency, technology, and corporate culpability, others view the issue 
from a different perspective.392 At least two scholars have advocated 
for treating AVs similarly to canines, where the owner is responsible 
for the autonomous chattel.393 Essentially, both dogs and cars act 
under the control of their human owners. The two chattels, however, 
are quite different. First, the sellers of AVs market the vehicles by 
promising that they are autonomous, self-driving, and safe.394 No 
canine vendor makes a similar claim; there is no promise that the dog 
will keep itself on a leash or teach itself not to bite others.395 With 
this disparity in promised outcomes, a canine never reaches the same 
duty of care guaranteed by AVs, and thus provides a poor analogy.396
The promise of AV technology seems to be that the technology 
is going to save the driver from him or herself.397 If the AV were a 
dog, it would never make a mess. In fact, it might help clean them 
 390. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04(5) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) 
(defining “person” to include individuals as well as organizations).
 391. See State v. Christy Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 17, 19-20 (Minn. 
1984) (discussing general principles governing agency culpability for corporations). 
 392. See, e.g., Gurney, supra note 11, at 251-52 (focusing on how tort 
liability applies to accidents involving autonomous vehicles).  
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care/dog-care/general-dog-care [https://perma.cc/7BJR-Q3GM] (last visited Dec. 27, 
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 396. See discussion supra Subsection II.B.2. 
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Part of a Self-Driving Car: Us, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 16, 2013, 8:29 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/16/self-driving-car_n_3909069.html [https:// 
perma.cc/PFA8-PLE8] (quoting a Stanford professor as saying, “[p]eople worry about 
the wrong thing when it comes to the safety of autonomous cars . . . There are going 
to be times where the driver has to take over. And that turns out to be by far the most 
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up. Under the promise of AVs, crash rates are meant to decrease as 
driver inattention becomes less dangerous.398 With all of this being 
the case, there is simply no precedent for answering complicated 
legal questions, and treating the AV like simple chattel does not 
resolve the issues of intent, agency, and corporate promises noted 
above.399 One struggles to think of any other technology that 
promises to operate an element of a human’s life more safely than 
does the human. No dog pound promises the buyer that the dog will 
do human things better than the human does, only to later be sued for 
failing to properly train the dog to be human.400 Yet, this is the world 
that AV companies promise—and the lawsuits are sure to follow. 
CONCLUSION
With the promise of AV technology comes a litany of new 
legal questions.401 Because no other product promises to obey the law 
in the same way as the AV, no other product has created the same 
legal issues.402 Most importantly, no other technology exists that can 
break the law without the input of the human operator, and AVs have 
the potential to do just that.403
As noted above, in analyzing the problems associated with 
AVs, adaptive cruise control often comes to mind.404 The technology 
purports to accelerate and decelerate with the traffic in which the 
vehicle is currently situated.405 As the car in front of the principal car 
speeds up, the principal car speeds up, and the opposite occurs when 
the vehicle in front slows down.406 As of right now, though, the 
criminal aspect of the technology is not an issue.407 The technology 
could cause the vehicle to go above the speed limit, but the human 
 398. See Muller, supra note 127. 
 399. See discussion supra Subsection IV.D.3. 
 400. This thought experiment, of course, is ridiculous; no canine can perform 
the majority of human functions. It is meant to indicate the complication of such a 
new and promising technology, particularly in contrast to simpler autonomous 
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 401. See Funkhouser, supra note 7, at 440 (discussing AV products liability). 
 402. Id. at 451 (noting that the legal course for AVs is not clear). 
 403. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 3 (describing Level 4 AV 
technology). 
 404. See generally Nice, supra note 107 (describing adaptive cruise control). 
 405. Id.
 406. Id.
 407. See supra Section II.B. 
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driver is still in full control of the vehicle.408 That is, the human 
driver sets the speed in the first place. If that speed exceeds the 
posted limit, then the human driver is responsible for the resulting 
legal consequence. The human has relinquished some control for the 
sake of convenience but has, in no sense, become less responsible for 
operating the vehicle.409
This is not the case with AV technology.410 AVs promise to 
take full control of the vehicle, and, with that full control, the 
manufacturers of the technology must take responsibility for the 
actions of the vehicle.411 States like Michigan have made incredible 
strides to accommodate AVs. But that legislation has not answered 
all of the questions that AVs pose, and states will need new 
legislation as technology evolves. With this in mind, new laws 
should allow for a products culpability cause of action, limiting the 
liability of the human operator according to the type of infraction—
whether that be a civil infraction, a strict liability crime, or an intent-
based crime.412 With this system in place, the fleet of vehicles on the 
road, along with the laws that govern them, will undergo a radical, 
beneficial change.413
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